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Abstract—To develop Smart City, the growing popularity of
Machine Learning (ML) that appreciates high-quality training
datasets generated from diverse IoT devices raises natural
questions about the privacy guarantees that can be provided in
such settings. Privacy-preserving ML training in an aggregation
scenario enables a model demander to securely train ML models
with the sensitive IoT data gathered from personal IoT devices.
Existing solutions are generally server-aided, cannot deal with the
collusion threat between the servers or between the servers and
data owners, and do not match the delicate environments of IoT.
We propose a privacy-preserving ML training framework named
Heda that consists of a library of building blocks based on partial
homomorphic encryption (PHE) enabling constructing multiple
privacy-preserving ML training protocols for the aggregation sce-
nario without the assistance of untrusted servers and defending
the security under collusion situations. Rigorous security analysis
demonstrates the proposed protocols can protect the privacy of
each participant in the honest-but-curious model and defend the
security under most collusion situations. Extensive experiments
validate the efficiency of Heda which achieves the privacy-
preserving ML training without losing the model accuracy.
Index Terms—IoT data, Machine Learning, Homomorphic
Encryption, Secure Two-party Computation, Modular Sequential
Composition
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of Things (IoT) plays a remarkable role in allaspects of our daily lives, covering various fields including
healthcare, industrial appliances, sports, homes, etc [1, 2]. The
large data collected from IoT devices with machine learning
(ML) technologies have been accelerating Smart City step
and improving our daily lives. For a personal healthcare
example, fitness records monitored by wearable IoT sensors
can be feeded to a ML model provided by medical research
institutions, for self-rated health measurement.
ML features data-driven [3]. The comprehensive training
dataset is one of the critical factors for accomplishing accurate
ML models. While the data collected from a single type of IoT
devices is not comprehensive. Or some companies (e.g., the
medical research institutions), desiring to develop a ML model
to provide the smart services to users, own no training data
generated from IoT devices. Mostly, the companies (model
demanders) have to develop ML models on the training dataset
gathered from multiple IoT data owners.
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TABLE I
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COLLABORATIVE SCENARIO AND AGGREGATION
SCENARIO
Aspects Differences Details
Model
Demander
In aggregation scenarios: the company that desires
ML models but has no training data is the model
demander.
In collaborative scenarios: every data owner is a
model demander.
Computation
Mode
In aggregation scenarios: the model demander inter-
acts with the data owners for initiative training models.
In collaborative scenarios: the data owners cooper-
ating with each other to training models, servers is
auxiliary.
Privacy
Guarantee
In aggregation scenarios: the model demander learns
nothing but the model; the data owners learn neither
the model nor the data of other data owners.
In collaborative scenarios: the data owners’ datasets
are confidential; the model is known by every partici-
pant.
However, the personal IoT data contains users’ sensitive
information. Privacy concerns and data protection laws sur-
rounding data sovereignty and jurisdiction prevent IoT data
owners from openly sharing users’ data [4, 5]. Besides, the
model demanders are unwilling to let others know about their
personal models. This paper focuses on ML training phase and
targets at the setting where a model demander learns nothing
but a final model from the gathered IoT dataset, and each
IoT data owner cannot learn any useful thing after sharing a
protected version data with the model demander.
To train ML models upon gathered datasets securely, most
existing works have explored the solutions under collaborative
scenarios (e.g., Federated Learning [6, 7] and Multi-party Col-
laborative Learning [8, 9]), where a set of data owners share
protected versions of their data with each other and jointly
train a global model over these data for themselves. Our setting
is different from them in some aspects. To distinguish from
them, we name our target setting as Aggregation Scenario,
the differences between the two scenarios are summarized in
Table I. Specifically, in most of solutions for collaborative
scenarios, the model is known by every data owner, which
ignores the security requirement of model demanders [10].
PrivFL [11] fits Federated Learning setting and considers
model privacy. But since it delegates most of heavy crypto-
graphic computations to data owners, and IoT data owners are
generally resource-constrained and cannot support the heavy
cryptographic computations generally. PrivFL dose not match
IoT setting. Besides, even though a method provides a separate
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2privacy-preserving solution for training one type of ML model
in collaborative scenarios such as for Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [9, 12], Linear Regression [13], Naive Bayesian (NB)
[14], and K-means [15], other types of ML models remain
unsolved, as well as the solutions for the aggregation scenario.
In our aggregation scenario, IoT data owners share protected
versions of their data with the model demander and only allow
to leak the information of the final model. To reduce the
computing load at the IoT data owner side, the model deman-
der shoulders most of the cryptographic computations. During
the whole training process, the model demander performs
computations on ciphertext to learn the model. Few works
explored privacy-preserving ML training in the aggregation
scenario. These works generally introduce untrusted servers
to facilitate secure training and cannot defend the security of
collusion situations [5, 10]. Once model demanders collude
with data owners [10] or the servers [5], the sensitive data in
the training dataset will be leaked in these methods. Privacy-
preserving data aggregation is a kind of fundamental algorithm
widely applied in IoT [16–18], which handles the scenario that
resembles the aggregation scenario. Since privacy-preserving
data aggregation solutions just attain simple operations such as
secure summation and secure maximum, it cannot cope with
the complex computations in ML training algorithms directly.
Given the limitations of existing schemes, designing a
privacy-preserving ML training scheme in the aggregation
scenario of IoT faces two main challenges. First, how to obtain
the correct model without loss of accuracy on the premise of
ensuring the security requirement in the aggregation scenario.
Without server-aid, the model demander is forced to only get
in touch with the ciphertext version of training data throughout
the training process for developing ML models. While most
ML training algorithms require iteratively updating model
parameters using training datasets, and updating the model
parameters using the protected version of datasets directly tend
to cause a accuracy loss in models. Second, how to guarantee
the security when the model demander colludes with data
owners or data owners collude with each other. Most existing
works limit the collusion situation such as prohibiting the
collusion between the model demander and data owners, to
meet the security requirements. While each participant has the
motives for collusion and inferring the sensitive information of
other participants. The complexity of the form of IoT privacy
data in collusion situations increases the difficulty of privacy-
preserving.
In this paper, we design a general framework that supports
training three ML models, Logistic Regression (LR), SVM and
NB, and allows the collusion between the model demander
and IoT data owners and the collusion between data owners.
Although practical deep learning models have sprung up and
achieved excellent results, it cannot replace these traditional
ML algorithms that are able to obtain accurate models from
small training datasets [19–21]. And some deep learning
applications employ traditional ML models (e.g., SVM and
LR) for final prediction outputs, where neural networks are
used to extract features [22, 23].
Contributions. To this end, we propose Heda, a general
privacy-preserving framework supporting multiple ML train-
ing protocols that satisfy the security requirements in the
aggregation scenario and the delicate environments of IoT.
A thorough security analysis is provided, demonstrating the
security of the proposed protocols in the honest-but-curious
model. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets validate
the proposed protocols achieve the privacy-preserving ML
training without losing the model accuracy. The contributions
of our paper can be summarized as follows.
1. In order to train ML models upon ciphertext without
accuracy loss, we design a library of building blocks, based
on the additively homomorphic encryption Paillier [37] and
multiplicative homomorphic encryption Cloud-RSA [38]. In-
spired by the idea of permutations and combinations that
complex algorithms can be decomposed into several primitive
operations, after identifying a set of core operations that
underlie many ML training algorithms, we carefully design
a library of building blocks supporting each of these core
operations.
2. To guarantee the security under the collusion situations
and meet the security requirements in the aggregation sce-
nario, we design other two building blocks that enable an
algorithm’s output to become the input of another algorithm.
All building blocks are designed in a composable way and
satisfy both functionality and security, where the security
of the combinations between building blocks is ensured by
Modular Sequential Composition [39].
3. We instantiate Heda to three privacy-preserving ML
training protocols: LR, SVM, and NB, without the assistance
of untrusted servers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to solve the non-linear function in privacy-preserving LR
training without any approximate equation.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides our related work. Section III provides the system
overview. In Section IV, we describe the background of PHE.
Section V details the building blocks of Heda. Section VI
presents the three training protocols instantiated from Heda.
The evaluation results are provided in Section VII. Section
VIII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
We devote to the privacy-preserving ML training in the ag-
gregation scenario, while many studies exploring the privacy-
preserving ML training fall in collaborative scenarios. More
details about the differences between the aggregation scenario
and collaborative scenarios can be found in Appendix A.
Our work is related to privacy-preserving ML which can
be broadly divided into privacy-preserving prediction and
privacy-preserving training. A series of excellent works have
been developed for privacy-preserving prediction [7, 24–26].
Some representative works for privacy-preserving prediction
are summarized in Table II. In this section, we give the liter-
ature review of privacy-preserving training in the aggregation
scenario and collaborative scenarios.
In collaborative scenarios. Collaborative scenarios often
occurs when multiple organizations have similar types of data,
and they want to train a more accurate model on their joint
their data [5, 9, 30, 40]. Mohassel et al. proposed a privacy-
preserving training scheme based on Garbled Circuit and
3TABLE II
SUMMARY OF EXISTING PRIVACY-PRESERVING MACHINE LEARNING SCHEMES
ML Phases Target Algorithms Solutions Ref.
Prediction
Deep Learning Differential Privacy [7]
Neural Network Secure Multi-party Computation [24]
Linear Regression Homomorphic Encryption [13]
Decision Trees, SVM and LR Homomorphic Encryption and Secret Sharing [25]
Hyperplane Decision, NB, and Decision Trees Homomorphic Encryption and Secret Sharing [26]
Training
Collaborative
Scenario
Deep Learning Differential Privacy [27]
Decision Trees Differential Privacy [28]
Linear Regression Differential Privacy [29]
SVM Homomorphic Encryption [9]
LR Homomorphic Encryption [30]
NB Homomorphic Encryption [14]
Linear Regression Homomorphic Encryption [31]
Linear Regression, LR and Neural Network Garbled Circuit and Secret Sharing [5]
Aggregation
Scenario
Aggregate Statistics Differential Privacy [32, 33]
Multilayer Perceptron Homomorphic Encryption [10]
Sums of vectors Secret Sharing [34]
Quadratic Optimization Problem Homomorphic Encryption [35]
k-means Homomorphic Encryption [36]
Secret Sharing where two untrusted non-colluding servers are
introduced [5]. Many secure PHE-based algorithms have been
developed for different specialized ML training algorithms
such as SVM [9], LR [30], Linear Regression [31] and NB
[14]. In order to handle complex non-linear function, PHE-
based schemes usually depend on the untrusted servers [9],
and use an approximate equation to simplify the complex
iteration formula into a simple one1 [5, 30]. Gonzlez et al. [9]
developed a secure addition algorithm and a secure subtraction
algorithm for constructing a secure SVM training algorithm,
while some operations that are not supported by Paillier have
to be implemented with the assistance of the untrusted servers.
Mandal et al. proposed PrivFL [11], which guarantees data
and model privacya and fits Federated Learning setting. But
it delegates most of heavy cryptographic computations to
data owners, which cannot match IoT setting where IoT data
owners are usually resource-constrained.
In aggregation scenarios. Several works explored privacy-
preserving aggregate statistics employing DP in the aggrega-
tion scenario [32, 33]. Training algorithms generally contain
multiple iterations, thus noise-based DP is not a good choice
for accuracy concern [7, 41]. Although, many efforts have
been done for making Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
practical, FHE is still unsuitable for general purpose appli-
cations [42]. Keith et al. [34] designed a protocol for secure
aggregation of high-dimensional data. Their protocol allows a
server to compute the sum of user-held data vectors from mo-
bile devices. Shoukry et al. [35] considered a problem where
multiple agents participate in solving a quadratic optimization
problem. They proposed a PHE based protocol finding the
optimal solution, where the privacy of the proposed protocol
was analyzed by the zero-knowledge proofs. Mittal et al. [36]
proposed a secure k-means data mining approach based on
PHE.
Li et al. [10] proposed a server-aid framework for training
multilayer perceptron in the aggregation scenarios. They intro-
1log( 1
1+exp(u)
) ≈
k∑
j=0
aj · uj
duce an untrusted server to assist the secure training and ignore
the collusion situation. Once the untrusted server colludes
with model demanders or data owners, the confidentiality
of models and datasets is not guaranteed. Mohassel et al.
[5] proposed a privacy-preserving machine learning scheme
with two untrusted but non-colluding servers. Their setting is
similar to ours if we treat one server as the model demander
and authorize it as the final model. But when an untrusted
server is treated as the model demander, it will collude with
the other server and figure out the plaintext training dataset.
Privacy-preserving data aggregation resembles the aggre-
gation scenario, which is a kind of fundamental algorithm
widely applied in Internet of Things [16], smart grid [17],
wireless sensor networks [18], etc. Since privacy-preserving
data aggregation achieves simple operations compared to ML
training such as secure summation, it cannot handle the
privacy-preserving ML training problem directly.
Although there are respectable studies on privacy-preserving
training as listed in Table II, solutions for the aggregation
scenario mainly rely on server-aid mode and cannot resist the
threat of the collusion between the model demander and data
owners. In this paper, we propose a general privacy-preserving
framework, which can construct multiple privacy-preserving
ML training protocols (including LR without simplification)
that can guarantee security under the collusion situations.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section presents the system model, the threat model,
and the security definitions used in this paper.
A. System Model
We envision a data-driven IoT ecosystem, shown in Fig. 1,
including IoT devices, IoT data owners and a model demander:
• IoT devices are responsible for sensing and transmitting
valuable IoT data through wireless or wired networks.
• Data owners collect all pieces of the IoT data from the
IoT devices within their own domains.
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Fig. 1. Aggregation Scenario: a model demander learns the model only, and data owners neither know the model information nor other data owners’ data.
• Model demander wants to training a ML model upon
the dataset gathered from multiple data owners.
We assume that all participants have agreed upon the system
of Heda to jointly train a model, and each data owner
consents to releasing the model to the server. Every data owner
generates its personal key pair to encrypted its data locally, and
the model demander also holds his own key pair for model
encryption.
Formally, our system consists of n data owners Oi (i ∈
{1, ..., n}) and one untrusted model demander A. Each data
owner Oi holds a dataset Di that contains users’ sensitive
information. This work considers horizontal data sharing
[27, 43, 44], that is, the n datasets {Di}ni=1 share the same
feature space but different in samples. The model demander
sequentially gathers the n encrypted data, and trains a ML
model M upon the dataset D := (D1 ∪ ... ∪ Dn), where
|D| =∑ni=1 |Di|. After executing a privacy-preserving train-
ing protocol F instantiated from Heda, the model demander
obtains the desired model, i.e., the model parameters θ.
Security Goals: The privacy-preserving training protocol F
satisfies the following security requirements:
• The model demander cannot learn any sensitive informa-
tion in the dataset D.
• Every data owner cannot know the model parameters θ.
• Each data owner Oi know nothing about other data
owners’ sensitive information.
B. Threat Model
All participants in our model do not trust one another. Each
data owner may try to learn as much other data owners’
sensitive data and the model demander’s model information
as possible by honestly executing the pre-defined protocol.
And the model demander follows the protocol honestly, but it
tries to infer data owners’ sensitive data as much as possible
from the values he learns. Therefore, for any participant, we
assume it is the passive (or honest-but-curious) adversary [45],
that is, it does follow the protocol, but it tries to infer other
participants’ privacy as much as possible from the values they
learn.
The proposed building blocks (except secure summation)
are in two-party computation setting which should be ensured
secure in the honest-but-curious model. While the privacy-
preserving ML training protocols constructed from building
blocks are multi-party protocols, where participants may col-
lude with each other to acquire more information for inferring
other participants’ privacy. In our solution, we allow (n− 1)
data owners at most collude with each other to steal the
privacy of other participants, and (n− 2) data owners at most
collude with the model demander to steal the privacy of other
participants. Notice that when n data owners collude with
each other, they can compute the model results on their joint
dataset straightforward, and defending this extreme situation
is meaningless.
Our model may encounter external adversaries that illegally
obtain the data in the transmission process for their purposes
by Internet eavesdropping or other means. While external
adversary can be controlled by setting up a confidential and
authentic channel using existing common technology like TSL.
Complementary directions. Since we assume every data
owner agrees on the Heda to release the global model to
the server, Heda dose not consider information leakage from
the model parameters at the server. Employing DP could
alleviate the information leakage, as the suggestion of existing
works [46, 47]. While there are multiple attacks against ML.
Protecting against these attacks is a complementary problem
to that solved by Heda, and the corresponding solutions can
be plugged into Heda.
C. Security Definition
To justify the security of two-party computation, we adapt
Secure Two-party Computation framework [26, 31, 45]. To
enable us to compose the building blocks into a privacy-
preserving ML training protocol in a modular way securely,
we invoke Modular Sequential Composition [39].
Secure Two-party Computation. For two-party protocols,
to ensure security, we have to show that whatever A (B) can
compute from its interactions with B (A) can be computed
from its input and output, which leads to a commonly used
definition, i.e., secure two-party computation [26, 31, 45].
5Let F = (fA, fB) be a (probabilistic) polynomial function.
pi is a protocol computing F . A and B want to compute
F (a, b) where a is A’s input and b is B’s input. The view of
party A during the execution of pi is the tuple viewpiA(a, b) =
(a, r,m1,m2, ...,mn) where m1,m2, ...,mn are the messages
received from B, r is A’s random tape. The view of B is defined
similarly. Secure Two-party Computation is stated formally as
follows:
Definition 1 (Secure Two-Party Computation [45]). A two-
part protocol pi privately computes f if for all possible
inputs (a, b) and simulators SA and SB hold the following
properties:
SA(a, fA(a, b)) ≡c viewpiA(a, b)
SB(b, fB(a, b)) ≡c viewpiB(a, b)
where ≡c denotes computational indistinguishability against
Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversaries with negli-
gible advantage in the security parameter λ [37].
More details of computational indistinguishability can be
found in Appendix B.
Modular Sequential Composition. Since all our protocols
are designed and constructed in a modular way, we employ
Modular Sequential Composition [39] for justifying the secu-
rity proofs of our protocols, the detailed idea of which can be
found in Appendix B.
Definition 2 (Modular Sequential Composition [39]). Let
f1, . . . , fn be two-party probabilistic polynomial time func-
tionalities and ρ1, . . . , ρn protocols that securely compute
respectively f1, . . . , fn in the presence of semi-honest adver-
saries. Let F be a probabilistic polynomial time functionality
and pi a protocol that securely computes F with f1, . . . , fn in
the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Then piρ1,ρ2,...,ρn se-
curely computes F in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
IV. PRELIMINARY
This section presents the PHE preliminaries used in this
paper. ML preliminaries used in this paper can be found
in Appendix C. Before presenting the main content, we
summarize the notations used in paper as follows. A dataset
D is an unordered set with the size of |D|. x denotes a
scalar. x ∈ Rd denotes a vector. xi = [xi1, xi2, . . . , xid] is
the i-th record in dataset D. Each record has d features. yi
is the class label correspond to xi. X = {x1,x2, . . . ,x|D|},
Y = {y1, y2, . . . , y|D|}. θ are the learnable parameters of ML
models. [m]P denotes a message m encrypted by Paillier. [m]R
denotes a message m encrypted by Cloud-RSA. [m] denotes an
encrypted message m that is encrypted with a non-specified
cryptosystems. Important notations are present in Table III.
Public-key cryptosystems employ a pair of keys (PK, SK),
the public key (PK, the encryption key) and the private key
(SK, the decryption key). Some cryptosystems are gifted with
a homomorphic property that can perform a set of operations
on encrypted data without knowledge of the decryption key.
Formalized definition of homomorphic can be found in Ap-
pendix L.
TABLE III
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Notation Meaning
n the number of data owners participating in scenario
Di dataset from the i-th data owner
D training dataset gathered from multiple data owners
d the number of features in D
xi the i-th record in training dataset D
yi the class label correspond to xi
θ learnable parameters of ML models
[m]P a message encrypted by Paillier
[m]R a message encrypted by Cloud-RSA
[m] a message encrypted by a non-specified cryptosystems
Two public-key cryptosystems are employed in this pa-
per: Paillier [37] and Cloud-RSA [38]. Paillier possesses ad-
ditively homomorphic properties, and Cloud-RSA possesses
multiplicative. Ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen
plaintext attacks [37] ensures that no bit of information is
leaked from ciphertexts. We prove the security of the proposed
algorithms and protocols based on the semantic security [37]
of Paillier and Cloud-RSA. Let GenModulus be a polynomial-
time algorithm that, on input 1n, outputs (N, p, q) where
N = pq and p and q are n-bit primes [37]. We restate the
definitions of Paillier and Cloud-RSA as following.
Paillier. The security of Paillier is based on the Decisional
Composite Residuosity assumption.
• Gen: run GenModulus(1n) to obtain (N, p, q). The public
key is N , and the private key is (N,φ(N)).
• Enc: on input a public key N and a message m ∈ ZN ,
choose an uniform r ← Z∗N and output the ciphertext
c := [(1 +N)mrNmodN2].
• Dec: on input a private key (N,φ(N)) and a ciphertext c,
output the message m := [ [c
φ(N)modN2]−1
N
φ(N)−1modN ].
Assuming a pair of ciphertext (c1, c2) is (m1,m2) under
the same Paillier encryption scheme, we have c1 × c2 =
(1 +N)m1+m2rNmodN2, m1 +m2 ∈ ZN , i.e.,
Paillier.Enc (m1+m2) = Paillier.Enc(m1) ∗ Paillier.Enc(m2)
Cloud-RSA. RSA relies on the hardness of factoring as-
sumption. Although RSA is commonly used for ensuring the
authenticity of digital data, many attacks still threaten the
security of RSA, such as Factorization attacks and Low private
exponent attacks [48, 48, 49]. To strengthen RSA security,
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme has been
proposed in order to convert the RSA into a probabilistic
encryption scheme and to achieve semantic security. But
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme removes the
multiplicative homomorphic property from RSA. To address
the drawbacks of RSA, Khalid et al. [38] has proposed an
enhanced encryption scheme named Cloud-RSA which keeps
the multiplicative homomorphic property of the plain RSA
and can resist the well-known attacks. Cloud-RSA encryption
scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is given:
• Gen: run GenModulus(1n) to obtain (N, p, q). choose
e > 1 such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. compute d :=
[e−1modφ(N)]. The public key is (N), and private key is
(N, e, d). Both the public key and private key of Cloud-
RSA are hold by data owners.
6• Enc: on input a message m ∈ Z∗N , output the ciphertext
c := [memodN ].
• Dec: on input a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗N , output the message
m := [cdmodN ].
For security proof details about Cloud-RSA, we refer
the reader to [38]. Assuming a pair of ciphertext (c1, c2) is
(m1,m2) under the same Cloud-RSA encryption scheme, we
have c1 × c2 = (c1c2)emodN , c1c2 ∈ Z∗N , i.e.,
CloudRSA.Enc (m1m2)=CloudRSA.Enc(m1)∗CloudRSA.Enc(m2)
V. BUILDING BLOCKS BASED ON PARTIAL HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION
This section details the design idea of Heda and the PHE-
based library of building blocks. Table IV lists the different
cases for each building block. For all building blocks, both
parties cannot obtain other useful information except for the
legal information.
Security Proofs. Formal cryptographic proofs of the building
blocks requires space beyond the page limit. Hence, we
provide the intuition behind the proofs, and delegate formal
proofs to Appendix H.
A. Design Idea
Just as a mathematical formula can be decomposed into the
permutation and combination of addition, subtraction, mul-
tiplication, and division, ML training algorithms can also be
decomposed into a set of core primitive operations. Intuitively,
we can design secure building blocks for each of core primitive
operations and appropriately combine them into the desire ML
training protocols that satisfy the security requirements in the
aggregation scenario.
After analyzing the typical supervised learning algorithms
(i.e., LR, SVM, and NB), we include addition, subtraction,
multiplication, power function, and summation as the core
primitive operations, see Table V for detail. Hence, we design
secure building blocks targeting each of these core operations.
Nevertheless, using the above secure building blocks is
inadequate for the security requirements in the aggregation
scenario. Since there are n data owners in Heda, and each
data owner has their own encryption schemes (i.e., a cer-
tain plaintext-ciphertext space with a pair of keys (PK,SK)).
Data owners send the ciphertext data encrypted by its public
key to the model demander. Homomorphic operations upon
the ciphertext can only be operated in the same plaintext-
ciphertext space. The model demander has to update the model
parameters upon the encrypted data under different plaintext-
ciphertext spaces.
To supplement and enable a building block’s output to
become the input of another, while maintaining the underlying
plaintext, we design two building blocks for converting from
the ciphertext under Cloud-RSA to under Paillier and convert-
ing the ciphertext under one data owner’s Paillier encryption
to the other data owner’s Paillier encryption.
B. Building Blocks for Primitive Operations
Since it is plain to obtain the secure addition, subtraction
and multiplication, we include them in the library of building
blocks directly:
• Building Block 1: secure addition with Paillier.
• Building Block 2: secure subtraction with Paillier.
• Building Block 3: secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplica-
tion with Cloud-RSA.
• Building Block 4: secure ciphertext-ciphertext multipli-
cation with Cloud-RSA.
Proposition V.1. Building Block 1-4 is secure in the honest-
but-curious model.
Proof Intuition V.1 (for Proposition A.1). The security
property of the four building blocks is straightforward by
ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks
of Paillier and Cloud-RSA. See Appendix H for a complete
proof.
Designing secure power function and secure summation
is not straightforward. This paper novelly proposes secure
power function and secure summation. From here onwards,
we introduce our particularly designed building blocks.
Building Block 5 : Secure Power Function. The key to se-
curely computing Sigmoid(βTx) = e
βTx
1+eβ
Tx
is to compute eβ
Tx.
Supposing a data owner encrypts ea = {ea1 , ea2 , . . . , ead
} by his CLoud-RSA public key and sends the ciphertext
[ea]R to a model demander. The model demander has b =
{b1, b2, . . . , bd}, and he wants to obtain [ea·b]R.
[ea·b]R =[e
a1b1+a2b2+...+adbd ]R
=
d∏
i=1
[eaibi ]R =
d∏
i=1
([eai ]R)
bi
(1)
Equation (1) specifies our secure power function. The key
point is that eaibi equals multiplying eai multiplied by itself bi
times. Along this way, the model demander is able to obtain
[ea·b]R by (
∑d
i=1 bi + d− 1) times multiplication.
Proposition V.2. Secure power function is secure in the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition V.2 (for Proposition A.2). The data owner
does not any message, his view only consists in its input. The
model demander do computation on the ciphertext encrypted
by the data owner’s public key. By ciphertext indistinguisha-
bility against chosen plaintext attacks of Cloud-RSA, the model
demander cannot learn any useful information. See Appendix
H for a complete proof.
Building Block 6 : Secure Summation. There are n data
owners. Each data owner Oi holds a value ai. Without
decryption and revealing the values to the model demander,
the model demander desire to obtain the summation of the n
values {ai}ni=0. Our secure summation solution is described
Building Blocks 6.
Specifically, A removes the encrypted noise ∑ni=1 ri from
res′ that is obtained at the step 7 of Building Blocks 6 as
following:
(i) From the first data owner to the last, A sequentially computes
[res′]iP := [res
′ − ri]iP using secure subtraction, and converts
[res′]iP to [res
′]i+1P by Building Block 8.
(ii) Finally, using Building Block 8, A converts [res]nP := res′ −∑n
c=1 ri which is encrypted by the last data owner’s Paillier public
key to [res]AP that is encrypted by itself.
7TABLE IV
THE CASES OF BUILDING BLOCKS
Algorithms Input OutputData Owner Model Demander Model Demander
Secure addition (SK,PK)Paillier, [a]P [b]P [a+ b]P
Secure subtraction (SK,PK)Paillier, [a]P [b]P [a− b]P
Secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication (SK,PK)Paillier, [a]P b [a ∗ b]P
Secure plaintext-ciphertext dot product (SK,PK)Paillier, [a]P b [a · b]P
Secure ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication (SK,PK)CloudRSA, [a]R [b]R [a ∗ b]R
Secure power function (SK,PK)CloudRSA, [ea]R b [ea·b]R
Secure summation (SK,PK)iPaillier, ai (SK,PK)
A
Paillier
∑n
i=1 ai
Converting [ea·b]R to [ea·b]P (SK,PK)Paillier,(SK,PK)CloudRSA [ea·b]R [ea·b]P
Converting [m]1P to [m]
2
P (SK,PK)
1
Paillier, (PK)
2
Paillier [m]
1
P [m]
2
P
TABLE V
CORE OPERATION OF MACHINE LEARNING TRAINING
Operations Add. Sub. Multi. Pow Comp. Sum.
LR X X X X
SVM X X X X
NB X X X
Building Block 6: Secure Summation
Participants:: n data owners, one model demander
Each Data Owner (O) Input: (PK, SK)iPaillier and ai
Model Demander (A) Input : (PK, SK)APaillier
Model Demander (A) Output: ∑ni=1 ai
1 for i = 1 to n do
2 Oi uniformly picks ri ∈ ZN ;
3 Oi: aˆi = ai + ri;
4 Oi: [ri]iP := Paillieri.Enc(ri);
5 Oi sends [ri]iP and ai + ri to A;
6 end
7 A: ˆres =∑ni=1(ai + ri);
8 A: [ ˆres]1P := Paillier1.Enc( ˆres);
9 for i = 1 to n− 1 do
10 A: [ ˆres]iP := [ ˆres]iP ∗ ([ri]iP )(−1) ;
11 A: converts [ ˆres]iP to [ ˆres]i+1P by Building Block 8;
12 end
13 A: [ ˆres]nP := [ ˆres]nP ∗ ([rn]nP )(−1) ;
14 A: converts [ ˆres]nP to [ ˆres]AP by Building Block 8;
15 A: res := PaillierA.Dec([ ˆres]AP ) . res =
∑n
i=1 ai;
16 return
∑n
i=1 ai to A.
Proposition V.3. Secure summation is secure in the honest-
but-curious model.
Proof Intuition V.3 (for Proposition A.3). The data owners
add random noise ri to ai, the random noise hides ai in
an information-theoretic way (it is an one-time pad). Even
though the model demander receives [ri]iP , the ciphertext
indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks of Paillier
prevents it figure out the ai from ri+ai. Besides, the Building
Block 8 is secure in the honest-but-curious model, we obtain
the security of secure summation using the definition of
Modular Sequential Composition.
As for the collusion situations, when (n − 1) data owners
collude with each other and the data owner Oi dose not
participate in the collusion, they can only figure out ai + ri
and
∑n
c=1 ac+ri cannot obtain ai or
∑n
c=1 ac. When (n−2)
data owners collude with the model demander, and Oi−1 and
Oi do not participate in the collusion, they can only figure out
ai−1 + ai cannot obtain ai or ai−1.
See Appendix H for a complete proof.
C. Building Blocks for Conversion
Since multiple encryption schemes are used in Heda, we
developed two protocols for converting ciphertexts from one
encryption scheme to another while maintaining the underly-
ing plaintexts.
Building Block 7 : Converting Cloud− RSA to Paillier
([ea·b]R to [ea·b]P ).
The model demander holds a ciphertext [ea·b]R encrypted
under a data owner’s Cloud-RSA public key. For continuing to
the subsequent ciphertext computations, the model demander
needs to convert [ea·b]R to the ciphertext encrypted by the
data owner’s Paillier public key. During the conversion, ea·b
is confidential to the model demander and the data owner.
Building Block 7: Converting [ea·b]R to [e
a·b]P
Data Owner (O) Input: (PK,SK)Paillier and (PK,SK)CloudRSA
Model Demander (A) Input: [ea·b]R
Model Demander (A) Output: [ea·b]P
1 A randomly picks r;
2 A: [ea·b+r]R := [ea·b]R ∗ [er]R;
3 A sends [ea·b+r]R to O;
4 O: ea·b+r := CloudRSA.Dec([ea·b+r]R);
5 O: [ea·b+r]P := Paillier.Enc(ea·b+r);
6 O sends [ea·b+r]P to A;
7 A: [ea·b]P := ([ea·b+r]P )e
−r
;
8 return [ea·b]P to A;
The correctness analysis is as follows: The model demander
randomly picks a random noise r, generates [ea·b+r]R by se-
cure ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication. Then the data owner
decrypts [ea·b+r]R with its SKCloudRSA and encrypts it with its
PKPaillier, obtaining [ea·b+r]P . Using secure plaintext-ciphertext
multiplication, the model demander multiplies [ea·b+r]P by e
−r
to remove er.
Proposition V.4. Secure converting [ea·b]R to [e
a·b]P is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition V.4 (for Proposition A.4). Even though the
data owner is able to decrypt and obtain ea·b+r, the random
noise r hides a · b in an information-theoretic way (it is an
one-time pad). See Appendix I for a complete proof.
8Building Block 8 : Converting one Paillier to Another Paillier
([m]1P to [m]
2
P ).
Building Block 8: Converting [m]1P to [m]
2
P
Data Owner (O) Input: (PK, SK)1Paillier and (PK)2Paillier
Model Demander (A) Input: [m]1P
Model Demander (A) Output: [m]2P
1 A uniformly picks r ∈ ZN ;
2 A: [m+ r]1P := [m]1P ∗ [r]1P ;
3 A sends [m+ r]1P to O;
4 O: m+ r := Paillier1.Dec([m+ r]1P);
5 O: [m+ r]2P := Paillier2.Enc(m+ r);
6 O sends [m+ r]2P to A;
7 A: [m]2P := [m+ r]1P ∗ [r]−1P ;
8 return [m]2P to A;
The model demander holds a ciphertext [m]1P encrypted by
the Paillier encryption of data owner 1. He wants to convert
[m]1P to the ciphertext [m]
2
P encrypted by another data owner’s
Paillier encryption. During the conversion, the message m is
revealed to the data owners or the model demander. Building
Block 8 achieves the switching of [m]1P to [m]
2
P .
In Building Block 8, the model demander adds a random
noise r to [m]1P by secure addition, obtaining [m+r]1P . Then the
data owner 1 decrypts the resulting value with his SKPaillier and
encrypts it with the other data owner’s Paillier key, obtaining
[m+ r]2P . The model demander is able to remove r from [m+
r]2P by using secure subtraction.
Proposition V.5. Secure converting [m]1P to [m]
2
P is secure
in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition V.5 (for Proposition A.5). The model deman-
der adds random noise to the ciphertext [m]1P . Even though
the data owner is able to decrypt and obtain m+r, the random
noise r hides m in an information-theoretic way (it is an one-
time pad). See Appendix I for a complete proof.
VI. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MACHINE LEARNING
TRAINING WITH HEDA
In this section, we detail how to construct the privacy-
preserving ML training protocols using the proposed building
blocks. Since these building blocks are designed in a modular
way, so carrying the privacy-preserving ML training come
down to invoking the right module.
For performing Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), the
model demander randomly selects a small number of records
from D in each iteration. Since the dataset D is gathered
sequentially, the model demander is able to locate the data
owner that the selected records belong to, which facilitates
subsequent ciphertext computations, i.e., the model demander
encrypts the correlative parameters using the picked data
owner’s public key. ML preliminaries used in this paper can
be found in Appendix C.
Both Paillier and Cloud-RSA work with positive integers in a
finite space, while the three ML training algorithms manipulate
floating point numbers. Hence, after detailed secure training
algorithms, we present the solution for dealing with floating
point numbers.
A. Secure Support Vector Machine Training
This paper adopts Hinge Loss with SGD for solving SVM,
which involves the less amount of vector multiplication than
other optimization methods [50]. We restate the iteration
equation:
θ := θ − λ(αθ − αyixˆi). (2)
In iteration, the key points are two multiplication λαyixˆi
and θTyixˆi. From the perspective of the model demander,
λαyixˆi and θTyixˆi belong to the plaintext-ciphetext multipli-
cation, where yixˆi is unseen but λα and θ are known. Thus,
the two multiplications are coped with by secure plaintext-
ciphertext multiplication. Fig. 2 specifies our secure SVM
training protocol instantiated from Heda, which needs 3
interactions (i.e. interactions between the model demander and
data owners) throughout each iteration.
Proposition VI.1. Privacy-preserving SVM training protocol
is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition VI.1 (for Proposition A.6). No collusion
happen: Data owners do not receive any message in the
protocol except for the auxiliary execution of secure building
blocks. All the training data is ciphertext that is encrypted
by corresponding data owners. The model demander can only
infer the training data from the model parameters, which is a
ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret [37]. As Building
Block used in this protocol are secure in the honest-but-
curious model, we obtain the security using modular sequential
composition.
As for the collusion situations, since the training data
and model parameters are encrypted by corresponding data
holders with their own public key. Without all the data owners
participating in the collusion, data owners cannot figure out the
complete model information. Without the corresponding pri-
vate key, the ciphertext indistinguishability of Paillier ensures
that no bit of information is leaked from ciphertexts of other
data owners who do not participating in the collusion.
See Appendix B for a complete proof and the definition of
ciphertext-only attack and perfectly secret.
B. Secure Logistic Regression Training
Here recalls the iteration equation of LR:
θj := θj − λ(xijyi − xij
1 + e−θTxi
) (3)
The complex part in Equation (12) is the Sigmoid function
xi
1+e−θTxi
. By adapting secure power function, the model
demander obtains [e−θ
Txi ]R first. Then, as specified in Fig.
3, the results in the operations of the model demander evolve
as follows:
[e−θ
Txi ]R → [e−θTxi ]p → [e−θTxi + 1]p → [e−θTxi+r + er]p
The model demander sends [e−θ
Txi+r + er]p to data owners.
The data owner carries on computations as following:
[e−θ
Txi+r + er]p → e−θTxi+r + er → xi
e−θTxi+r + er
9Protocol 1: Privacy-Preserving SVM Training
Participants: 𝑛 Data Owners {𝒪𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 , one Model Demander 𝒜
Output: model parameters 𝜃 to 𝒜
Each Data Owners (𝓞𝒊) Input: datasets 𝐷𝑖, (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖
Model Demander (𝓐) Input:  learning rate 𝜆, maxIters 𝑇, (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝒜
Data Owners Model Demander
𝑛 data owners encrypt data with its (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 :
𝒪𝑖: [Y]𝑃
𝑖 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 . Enc({𝑦𝑗}𝑗=1
|𝐷𝑖| );
𝒪𝑖: [XY]𝑃
𝑖 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 . Enc({x𝑗𝑦𝑗}𝑖=1
|𝐷𝑖|);
𝒪𝑖 sends the encrypted data ([Y]𝑃
𝑖 , [XY]𝑃
𝑖 )to 𝒜;
initialize 𝜃;
receive [𝐷]𝑃= {([Y]𝑃
𝑖 , [XY]𝑃
𝑖 )}𝑖=1
𝑛 ;
Repeat the following steps 𝑇 times:
take 𝑡 ∈ {1,2, … ,  𝑖=1
𝑛 |𝐷𝑖|} at random;
take the (PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 correspond to t;  a 
select [𝑦𝑡]𝑃 and [x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃 from [𝐷]𝑃; aa
aa obtain [𝜃x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃 by secure plaintext-ciphertext dot product; [𝜃x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃≔  𝑖=1
𝑑 ([𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑡]𝑃)
𝜃𝑖
aa obtain [𝜆𝛼x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃 by secure plaintext-ciphertext dot product; [𝜆𝛼x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃≔  𝑖=1
𝑑 ([𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑡]𝑃)
𝜆𝛼
aa update [𝜃]𝑃 in Equation (15) by secure addition; [𝜃]𝑃≔ 1− 𝜆𝛼 𝜃 + 𝜆𝛼x𝑡𝑦𝑡 𝑃
auxiliary execution of Building Block 9; convert [𝜃]𝑃 encrtpted by data owner to model demander 
by Building Block 9;
obtain the updated 𝜃;
Encrypted Dataset
Interactive Computation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Fig. 2. Privacy-Preserving Support Vector Machine Training Protocol
The data owner returns the encrypted resulting value
[ xi
(e−θTxi+1)∗er ]P to the model demander. Finally, removing the
noise er, the model demander get [ xi
1+e−θTxi
]P . Fig. 3 specifies
the privacy-preserving LR training protocol, which needs 4
interactions (i.e. interactions between the model demander and
data owners) throughout each iteration.
Proposition VI.2. Privacy-preserving LR training protocol is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition VI.2 (for Proposition A.7). No collusion
happen: In the process of sigmoid function solution, even
though the data owners is able to decrypt e−θ
Txi+r + er, the
random noise r hides θ in an information-theoretic way (it
is an one-time pad). All the training data is ciphertext that is
encrypted by corresponding data owners. The model demander
can only infer the training data from the model parameters,
which is a ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret. The
collusion situations is similar as Protocol 1, so we do not
repeat them here. See Appendix J for a complete proof.
C. Secure Naive Bayes Training
For learning a NB model from dataset D, the model
demander needs to compute the the class prior probability P (y)
and the conditional probability P (xi|y).
P (xi|y) :=

|Dy(xij)|
m
, discrete attribute
1√
2piσy,j
exp(− (xij−µy,j)
2
2σ2y,j
), numeric attribute
(4)
If the j-th attribute is a discrete attribute, the conditional
probability is P (xij |y) = |D
y(xij)|
m
, where the total number of
records m is public [8] without loss of generality. |Dy(xij)|
is the number of records belonging to class y with the
attribute value xij in D. Since there are n data owners in
the aggregation scenario, |Dy(xij)| =∑nc=1 |Dyc (xij)|.
The class prior probability i.e., P (y) =
∑n
c=1 |Dc(y)|
m
has a
similar computation manner with the conditional probability
of discrete attributes, where |Dc(y)| is the number of records
belonging to class y in Dc.
If the j-th attribute is a numeric attribute, we assume that the
j-th attribute obeys normal distribution, where two parameters
need to be estimated securely: mean µy,j and variance σ2y,j .
µy,j =
∑|D|
i=1 xij
m
σ2y,j =
∑|D|
i=1 (µy,j − xij)2
m
=
∑|D|
i=1(µy,j)
2 + (x2ij − 2µy,jxij)
m
=
∑|D|
i=1(µy,j)
2
m
+
∑|D|
i=1(xij)
2
m
− 2µy,j ∗
∑|D|
i=1(xij)
m
(5)
Employing secure summation protocol, we obtain∑n
c=1 |Dc(y)|,
∑n
c=1 |Dyc (xij)|,
∑|D|
i=1 xij and
∑|D|
i=1(xij)
2
securely. Fig. 4 specifies our privacy NB training protocol.
Since the conditional probability of each feature can be
figured out concurrently, the number of interactions is
depended on the number of involved secure summation
algorithm, e.i., n+ 1 interactions.
Proposition VI.3. Privacy-preserving NB training protocol is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof Intuition VI.3 (for Proposition A.8). No collusion
happen: Data owners do not receive any message in the
protocol except for the auxiliary execution of secure building
blocks. All the training data is ciphertext that is encrypted
by corresponding data holders. As Building Block used in
this protocol are secure in the honest-but-curious model, we
obtain the security using modular sequential composition. The
collusion situations is similar as Protocol 1, so we do not
repeat them here. See Appendix J for a complete proof.
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Protocol 2: Privacy-Preserving LR Training
Participants: 𝑛 Data Owners {𝒪𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 , one Model Demander 𝒜
Output: model parameters 𝜃 to 𝒜
Each Data Owners (𝓞𝒊) Input: datasets 𝐷𝑖, (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 , , (SK, PK)𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑅𝑆𝐴
𝑖
Model Demander (𝓐) Input:  learning rate 𝜆, maxIters 𝑇, (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝒜
Data Owners Model Demander
𝑛 data owners encrypt data with its (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖
:
𝒪𝑖: [XY]𝑃
𝑖 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 . Enc({x𝑗𝑦𝑗}𝑖=1
|𝐷𝑖|);
𝑛 data owners encrypt data with its (SK, PK)𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑅𝑆𝐴
𝑖 :
𝒪𝑖: [𝑒
X]𝑅
𝑖 :=𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑𝑅𝑆𝐴𝑖 . Enc({𝑒x𝑗}𝑖=1
|𝐷𝑖|);
𝑛 data owners send the encrypted data 
([𝑒X]𝑅
𝑖 , [XY]𝑃
𝑖 ) to 𝒜;
Initialize 𝜃;
Receive [𝐷]𝑃= {([𝑒
X]R
𝑖 , [XY]𝑃
𝑖 )}𝑖=1
𝑛 ;
Repeat the following steps 𝑇 times:aaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
take 𝑡 ∈ {1,2, … ,  𝑖=1
𝑛 |𝐷𝑖|} at random;
take the (PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 correspond to t;
select [𝑒x𝑡]𝑅 and [x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃 from [𝐷]𝑃
Auxiliary execution of Building Block 5; obtain[𝑒−𝜃x𝑡]𝑅 by secure  power function;
Auxiliary execution of Building Block 7; convert [𝑒−𝜃x𝑡]𝑅 to [𝑒
−𝜃x𝑡]𝑃 by Building Block 7;
obtain [𝑒−𝜃x𝑡 + 1]𝑃 by secure addition; [𝑒
−𝜃x𝑡 + 1]𝑃≔ 𝑒
−𝜃x𝑡
𝑃
∗ [1]𝑃
aa
obtain [𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟]𝑃 by secure plaintext-ciphertext
multiplication;
[𝑒−𝜃𝑥𝑡𝑖+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟]𝑃≔ ([𝑒
−𝜃𝑥𝑡𝑖 + 1]𝑃)
𝑒𝑟
𝒪𝑖 decrypts [𝑒
−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟]𝑃 by (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 ; send [𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟]𝑃 to the data owner 𝒪𝑖;
𝒪𝑖 computes 
x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟+𝑒𝑟;
𝒪𝑖 encrypts 
x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟+𝑒𝑟 by (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑖 ;
𝒪𝑖 sends [
x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟+𝑒𝑟]𝑃 to 𝒜;
obtain[
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1]𝑃 by secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication; [
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1]𝑃≔ ([
x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟+𝑒𝑟]𝑃)
𝜆∗𝑒𝑟
obtain [𝜃 +
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1]𝑃 by secure addition; [𝜃 +
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1]𝑃≔
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1 𝑃
∗ [𝜃]𝑃
aa obtain [𝜆x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃 by secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication; [𝜆x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃≔ ([x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃)
𝜆
aa update [𝜃]𝑃 in Equation (16) by secure subtraction; [𝜃]𝑃≔ 𝜃 +
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1− 𝜆x𝑡𝑦𝑡 𝑃
= 𝜃 +
𝜆x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+1 𝑃
∗ ([𝜆x𝑡𝑦𝑡]𝑃)
−1Auxiliary execution of Building Block 8;
convert [𝜃]𝑃 encrtpted by data owner to model demander by 
Building Block 8;
obtain the updated 𝜃;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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[𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟]𝑃
[
x𝑡
𝑒−𝜃x𝑡+𝑟 + 𝑒𝑟
]𝑃
Interactive Computation
Sigmoid
Function 
Solution
Records selection for SGD
Fig. 3. Privacy-Preserving Logistic Regression Training Protocol
D. Dealing with Floating Point Numbers
The floating point number issues for PHE based secure ML
training have been previously studied [9, 26]. Using similar
idea, we perform the format conversion by multiplying each
floating point value v by a big constant 10e for fixed point
representation. Empirically, we retained two decimal places
(i.e., e = 2) for each floating point value involved in our
implementation. Suppose v is a floating point number that is
fixed to 2 decimal places in decimalism. Then,
(v)10 =
(vˆ)10
102
, vˆ ∈ N, vˆ > 0 (6)
Without loss of generality, when facing the same training
task, we assume that features of records in training dataset
have been locally preprocessed and restricted in range [0,
1]. Despite the data standardization on training dataset, when
the ciphertext is calculated many times, the vˆ may become
very large integers, which might cause overflows errors. We
must ensure log10N > e∗, where N denotes the modulus for
Paillier or Cloud-RSA’s cryptosystem, and e∗ denotes log10vˆ.
log10N ≈ 308 when 1024-bit key length, and log10N ≈ 616
when 2048-bit key length.
For Protocol 1. Referring to Fig. 2, at the end of each
iteration, θ is refreshed with the format of Equation (6) (e∗ ≤
2). There are 2 secure plaintext-ciphertext dot product for each
record throughout an iteration. 2048-bit key length is enough
to control these computations.
For Protocol 2. Referring to Fig. 3, at the end of each
iteration, θ is refreshed with the format of Equation (6)
(e∗ ≤ 2). We discuss the situation of e∗ in secure power
function where [exi·θ]R is obtained by (
∑d
i=1 θi+ d− 1) times
multiplication of [exi ]R. Since, e∗ ≤ 2 for [exi ]R, we must
ensure:
log10N > (
d∑
i=1
θi + d− 1) ∗ 2 (7)
In the implementation of secure power function, we de-
compose θi into an integer part and a decimal part: θi =
θ1i +
θ2i
102
, θ1i ≥ 0, 100 > θ2i ≥ 1. After obtaining [exiθ1i ]R
and [exiθ2i ]R, we merge the respective results for recovering:
eθixi = eθ
1
i xi ∗ 100
√
eθ
2
i xi . We provide a case study for expli-
cating the recovering of eθixi from [exiθ1i ]R and [exiθ2i ]R in
Appendix M. The key length of Cloud-RSA in Protocol 2 can
be set appropriately according to Equation (7) and the number
of features.
After secure power function, the e∗ is refreshed to 2 in
Bilding Block 8. Subsequent operations in an iteration, 3
secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication, 2 secure addition,
are controlled naturally.
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Protocol 3: Privacy-Preserving NB Training
Participants: 𝑛 Data Owners {𝒪𝑐}𝑐=1
𝑛 , one Model Demander 𝒜
Output: 𝑃(𝑦) and 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑗|𝑦) to 𝒜
Each Data Owners (𝓞𝒄) Input: datasets 𝐷𝑐, (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑐
Model Demander (𝓐) Input: (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝒜
Data Owners Model Demander
𝑛 data owners encrypt data with its (SK, PK)𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟
𝑐 :
Receive [𝐷]𝑃= {( sum(X𝑗) 𝑃
𝑐
, [sum((X𝑗)
2)]𝑃
𝑐 )}𝑐=1
𝑛
∪ { |𝐷𝑐 𝑦 | 𝑃
𝑐 , |𝐷𝑐
𝑦 𝑥𝑖𝑗 | 𝑃
𝑐
}𝑐=1
𝑛 ;
𝒪𝑖: [|𝐷𝑐(𝑦)|]𝑃
𝑐 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑐 . Enc(
|𝐷𝑐(𝑦)|
𝑚
);
𝒪𝑖: [|𝐷𝑐
𝑦(𝑥𝑖𝑗)|]𝑃
𝑐 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑐 . Enc(
|𝐷𝑐
𝑦
(𝑥𝑖𝑗)|
𝑚
);
𝒪𝑖: [sum(X𝑗)]𝑃
𝑐 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑐 . Enc(
 𝑖=1
|𝐷𝑐| 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
);
𝒪𝑖: [sum((X𝑗)
2)]𝑃
𝑐 :=𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑐 . Enc(
 𝑖=1
|𝐷𝑐|(𝑥𝑖𝑗)
2
𝑚
);
𝒪𝑖 sends the encrypted data to 𝒜;
Auxiliary execution of Building Block 7; Computes 𝑃(𝑦) by secure summation protocol; 𝑃 𝑦 =
 𝑐=1
𝑛 |𝐷𝑐 𝑦 |
𝑚
a
j=1; For j to d, repeat the following steps:
If j-th attrinute is a discrete attribute:
Auxiliary execution of Building Block 7; computes 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑗|𝑦) by secure summation protocol; 𝑃 𝑥𝑖𝑗|𝑦 =
 𝑐=1
𝑛 |𝐷𝑐
𝑦
𝑥𝑖𝑗 |
𝑚
a
If j-th attrinute is a  numeric attribute:
Auxiliary execution of Building Block 7; obtain 𝜇𝑦,𝑗 by secure summation protocol; 𝜇𝑦,𝑗 =
 𝑐=1
𝑛 sum(X𝑗) 𝑃
𝑐
𝑚
obtain
 𝑖=1
|𝐷|
(𝑥𝑖𝑗)
2
𝑚
by secure summation protocol;
 𝑖=1
𝐷 𝑥𝑖𝑗
2
𝑚
=
 𝑐=1
𝑛 (sum(X𝑗))2 𝑃
𝑐
𝑚
aaAuxiliary execution of Building Block 7;
compute 𝜎𝑦,𝑗
2 by Equation (17) 𝜎𝑦,𝑗
2 =
 𝑖=1
|𝐷|
(𝜇𝑦,𝑗)
2
𝑚
-2(𝜇𝑦,𝑗)
2+
 𝑖=1
|𝐷|
(𝑥𝑖𝑗)
2
𝑚
Return the parameters of 𝑃(𝑦) and 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑗|𝑦) to 𝒜
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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9.
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16.
Encrypted Dataset
Interactive Computation
Interactive Computation
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Fig. 4. Privacy-Preserving Logistic Regression Training Protocol
For Protocol 3. As shown in Fig. 4, the main computation
focus on the 4 operations of secure summation. Referring to
the 10 and 11 steps of Building Block 6, in secure summation
e∗ is refreshed to 2 once a secure addition’s computation
ends. Therefor, 2048-bit key length is enough to control these
computations.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation of Heda from the
following aspects: (i) the performance overhead of Heda, (ii)
the scalability of Heda.
A. Preparations
Implementations. In our design, each IoT data owner col-
lects all pieces of data from the IoT devices in its own domain
and then performs the following operations of Heda. Data
owners and the model demander have adequate computing
resources generally. Our experiments are run using a desktop
computer with the configuration: single Intel i7 (i7-3770 64bit)
processor for a total of 4 cores running at 3.40GHz and 8
GB RAM. We implement all the proposed protocols in Java
Development Kit 1.8. Since multiple participants are involved
in Heda, we mimic real network latency to be 30 ms for the
round trip time of a packet.
Datasets. In our experiments, we use four datasets which are
listed in Table VI from the UCI Machine Learning Repository.
Key length setting. The key length is not only related to the
security guaranteed by cryptosystems but also to the plaintext
space. The underlying plaintext operated in the proposed
protocols should be limited in a finite plaintext space that is
TABLE VI
DATASETS USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
Datasets Records Attributes Storage
BCWD 699 9 172KB
Adult 32561 14 11956KB
CAD 690 15 271KB
Car 1728 6 297KB
defined by the key length. As analyzed in Section VI-D, we use
2048-bit cryptographic keys in Paillier for the four datasets.
We use 2048-bit cryptographic keys in Cloud-RSA for BCWD
and Car datasets and 4096-bit cryptographic keys for Adult
and CAD datasets.
B. Accuracy and Efficiency Evaluation of Heda
Heda consists of a set of building blocks supporting the
fundamental operations that underlie many ML training al-
gorithms. In this subsection, we present the performance of
each building block first, following with the performance of
the three privacy-preserving ML training protocols instantiated
from Heda.
1) Performance of Building Blocks: We run 50 times per
building blocks and report the averages, with 5-dimensional
vectors. Table VII shows the results in terms of the time
consumption at data owners O and the model demander A, the
number of interactions (round trips) and the communication
overhead. The total time consumption includes the time spend
on encryption and decryption, the computation time consump-
tion and the mimicked network latency. We observe that all
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TABLE VII
BUILDING BLOCKS PERFORMANCE
algorithm Computation Total Inter. Comm.O A Time
Addition - 1ms 1ms 0 -
Subtraction 35ms 49ms 113ms 1 1.17kB
P-C Mult - 150ms 150ms 0 -
Dot Product - 630ms 630ms 0 -
C-C Mult - 1ms 1ms 0 -
Power Function 23ms 3ms 56ms 1 0.33kB
Exchange 1 152ms 71ms 253ms 1 0.55kB
Exchange 2 1ms 16ms 47ms 1 0.55kB
protocols of Heda are efficient, with a runtime on the order
of milliseconds.
2) Performance of Privacy-preserving ML Training Pro-
tocols: We instantiate Heda to three protocols to illustrate
the power of Heda: Heda-SVM (Protocol 1), Heda-LR
(Protocol 2) and Heda-NB (Protocol 3). We run these three
protocols on datasets BCWD. Table VIII providers the overall
performance. The accuracy is evaluated by a widely used
criterion (accuracy = #correctly classified records#total records ). The total
time consumption includes the time spend on encryption and
decryption, the computation time consumption and the mimic
network latency.
To observe whether Heda causes an accuracy loss when
conducing privacy-preserving ML training, the standard im-
plementations for LR, SVM and NB where models are trained
non-privately using scikit-learn2 are employed as the control
group. By comparing the accuracy, it is clear that although
the three protocols deal with the encrypted dataset, they have
almost no loss of accuracy. Since the three protocols perform
operations on ciphertext, the total time consumption is higher
than the non-privacy ML training. But training a model is still
in an acceptable time consumption, as shown in Table VIII.
We believe Heda to be practical for sensitive applications.
The maximum number of iterations for Heda-LR and
Heda-SVM are set to 1000 and 1000 respectively. The number
of interactions is determined by the maximum number of
iterations in these two protocols. The bandwidth can reach over
10MB/s in most practical application, thus the communication
overhead shown in Table VIII is acceptable.
3) Comparison with Prior Works: We implement the three
latest and effective solutions that considered using PHE to
solve privacy-preserving ML training: secure LR training
(PLR) [30], secure SVM training (PSVM) [9], and secure
NB training (PNB) [51] where the privacy budget was set
as 1 according to the authors’ setting. The comparison results
between the proposed protocols instantiated from Heda and
the three solutions are reported in Table IX.
The first thing worth to mention is that PLR, PSVM, and
PNB all need to introduce untrusted servers for completing
the secure training computation, while there are only two
types of roles in Heda, i.e., the data owner and the model
demander. Additional roles may cause more communication
delay and more privacy compromises because of the complex
role scenarios.
2http://scikit-learn.org
PLR [30] handles the sigmoid function by an approximate
equation, which causes a loss of accuracy. Heda-LR actually
solve the sigmoid function without any approximate equation.
Thus the accuracy of Heda-LR is higher than PLR [30]. Since
the sigmoid function asks for the power operation, Heda-LR
spends more time than PLR does. Actually, in many scenarios,
accuracy is a more important standard than time consumption,
such as in disease prediction system where experts are willing
to obtain a more accurate prediction model at the expense of
time consumption.
Heda-SVM and PSVM [9] both rely on PHE, thus there is
little difference in accuracy. While Heda-SVM do not need
untrusted servers, the overhead of communication and interac-
tions is less than PSVM. Moreover, the secure multiplication
protocol in PSVM [9] rely on the heavy interaction between
the untrusted servers and data owners, which cause more
communication delay. The model demander can complete
the secure multiplication independently in our solution, after
receiveing the encrypted data.
PNB [51] protects the initial data by adding noise (i.e.,
DP mechanism), which inevitably reduces the accuracy of
the trained model. Heda-NB does not harm for the accuracy,
which is confirmed in Table IX.
C. Scalability Evaluation of Heda
We evaluate the scalability of Heda in the two aspects: (i)
changing the number of participants, and keeping the number
of records in training datasets unchanged. (ii) changing the
number of records in training datasets, and keeping the number
of participants unchanged.
1) Changing Participant Number: We divide dataset Adult
into n equal parts to simulate n data owners participating in
the same protocol, and varied the value of n. A series of
experiments are carried out respecting to different n values.
The number of records in training datasets remains unchanged,
i.e., the whole dataset Adult was employed in each experiment.
Experimental results are plotted in Fig. 5.
SGD is chose as the optimization method in Heda-LR and
Heda-SVM. Theoretically, in these two protocols, after data
owners send the encrypted datasets to the model demander, the
time consumption is only related to the iteration number and
the number of the training samples selected at each iteration,
which is confirmed in Fig. 5(a) and 5(b). On the other hand,
when the data quality is unchanged, the increasing number
of data owners does not affect the accuracy of the trained
model. A slight fluctuation of accuracy shown in Fig. 5(a) and
Fig. 5(b) is ascribed to the random selection of initialization
parameters and SGD.
In Heda-NB, after obtaining the noised summation, the
model demander interacts with data owners to eliminate the
noise in Secure Summation. Thus, with the increasing number
of data owners, the time consumption increases in Heda-NB.
As shown in Fig. 5(c), the increase in time consumption is not
violent (more moderate than linear growth).
2) Changing Record Number: We vary the record number
of training datasets from 5000 to 30000 at the interval of 5000,
upon dataset Adult. Then, we conduct a series of experiments
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TABLE VIII
PERFORMANCE OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING ML TRAINING PROTOCOLS INSTANTIATED FROM HEDA
Algorithms Accuracy Interactions Comm. Total Time Time per participantO A
Heda-LR 96.52% 4000 514.01MB 2239.70s 1523.34s 626.36s
Heda-SVM 96.13% 3000 532.55MB 605.95s 193.57s 382.38s
Heda-NB 95.99% 30 7.92MB 4.80s 0.74s 3.15s
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Fig. 5. Scalability evaluation of Heda when the number of participants changes, and the number of records in training datasets remains unchanged. The
abscissa shows the changes in the number of O. The bars represent the time consumption, and the line represents the accuracy.
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Fig. 6. Scalability evaluation of Heda when the number of records changes, the number of participants remains unchanged. The abscissa shows the changes in
the number of records in training dataset, where O’s number is fixed to 5. The bars and the line represent the time consumption and the accuracy respectively.
TABLE IX
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
(a) Logistic Regression
Accuracy Time Consumption
Dataset Original Ours PLR Ours PLR
BCWD 96.85% 96.85% 95.99% 2239.70s 1849.81s
Adult 81.44% 81.07% 78.87% 8539.36s 7581.73s
CAD 85.65% 86.23% 83.76% 4382.94s 3644.10s
Car 72.39% 71.99% 70.37% 1793.66s 1287.81
(b) Support Vector Machine
Accuracy Time Consumption
Dataset Original Ours PSVM Ours PSVM
BCWD 96.13% 96.85% 95.42% 605.95s 650.03s
Adult 81.62% 81.35% 81.00% 3132.15s 3269.03s
CAD 86.81% 86.23% 85.21% 1079.33s 1153.51s
Car 73.66% 73.03% 72.33% 389.70s 403.00s
(c) Naive Bayes
Accuracy Time Consumption
Dataset Original Ours PNB Ours PNB
BCWD 95.85% 95.27% 72.09% 5.01s 6.82s
Adult 80.38% 80.70% 70.02% 7.94s 9.14s
CAD 80.57% 82.17% 70.47% 8.96s 10.45s
Car 78.93% 77.31% 69.68% 2.81s 4.11s
respecting to these training datasets with different record
numbers, where the number of data owners is fixed as 5 in
these experiments. Experimental results are visualized in Fig.
6.
Experiment results confirm that supervised ML appreciates
large and comprehensive training data [3]. As the number of
records in training data increases, the accuracy of the trained
model in Heda-LR and Heda-SVM increases to a certain
extent. In Heda-NB, the time consumption is related to the
number of data owners and the number of attributes, and in
Heda-LR and Heda-SVM the time consumption is related
to the number of iterations and the number of the training
samples selected at each iteration, thus the changes in the
record number does not affect the time consumption.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-preserving ML
training framework named Heda for securely handling IoT
data collected from diverse IoT devices. By applying Paillier
and Cloud-RSA, we develop a library of building blocks
based on partial homomorphic encryption to support training
multiple ML models in the aggregation scenario of IoT. We
demonstrate the efficiency and the security of Heda through
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rigorous security analysis and extensive experiments. In the
future work, we plan to explore a more outstanding solution
enabling the balance between efficiency and accuracy for
privacy-preserving ML training.
APPENDIX
A. Problem Description
We devote to the privacy-preserving ML training in aggre-
gation scenario, while many studies exploring the privacy-
preserving ML training fall in collaborative scenarios. This
section presents the formal description of the aggregation sce-
nario and collaborative scenario, followed with the differences
description between the two.
In aggregation scenario, an untrusted model demander
wishes to train a ML model over the training dataset gathered
from multiple data owners (organizations). Each data owner
sends the encrypted dataset encrypted by its own private key
to the model demander. During the whole training process,
the sensitive model information of the model demander is not
revealed to the data owners. And the dataset of each data owner
is also confidential for the model demander.
In collaborative scenarios, a set of data owners want to
train ML models on their joint data. These data owners
outsource the computation to several untrusted servers. During
the training process, each data owner cannot learn the sensitive
data of other data owners, but the model information is known
to both the data owners and the untrusted servers.
More specifically, they differ in
• Different Model Demanders: the demander in aggrega-
tion scenario is the untrusted model demander, and in
collaborative scenario is each data owner.
• Different Privacy Guarantee: in aggregation scenario, the
untrusted model demander cannot learn anything about
the data owners’ sensitive data, and each data owner learn
neither the model nor the sensitive data of other data
owners; in collaborative scenario, the untrusted servers
learning nothing about the data owners’ sensitive data,
while the model is known by every participant.
• Different Compute Mode: in aggregation scenario, the
untrusted model demander interacts with the data owners
for training models; in collaborative scenario, the data
owners generally outsource part or all computations to
the untrusted servers.
B. Security Definition
Definition 3 (Computational Indistinguishability [37]). Two
probability ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are
computationally indistinguishable, denoted X≡cY , if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D there exists a
negligible function negl such that:
Pr
x←Xn
[D(1n, x) = 1]− Pr
y←Yn
[D(1n, y) = 1]|| ≤ negl(n)
For more details of probabilistic polynomial-time distin-
guisher and negligible function, we refer the reader to [37].
Modular Sequential Composition. Since all our protocols
are designed and constructed in a modular way, we employ
Modular Sequential Composition [39] for justifying the secu-
rity proofs of our protocols, the idea of which is that:
(i) A and B run a protocol pi and use calls to an ideal
functionality f . If we can show that pi respects privacy in
the honest-but-curious model and we have a protocol ρ that
privately computes f in the same model, then we can replace
the ideal calls for f by the execution of ρ in pi; The new
protocol, denoted piρ is then secure in the honest-but-curious
model.
(ii) A protocol pi is a hybrid model that uses calls to
f1, . . . , fn. The hybrid model with ideal access to f1, . . . , fn is
augmented with an incorruptible trusted party T. The running
of protocol pi contains calls to T for the execution of one
of f1, . . . , fn. Since the proposed protocols in this paper are
considered as sequential composition, each party sends its
input and wait until the trusted party sends the output back
for each call. Let ρ1, . . . , ρn be real protocols in the semi-
honest model securely computing f1, . . . , fn. In piρ1,...,ρn , fi
is replaced by a real execution of ρi. During the executing
processes of piρ1,...,ρn , if a participates Pi of piρ1,...,ρn has to
compute fj in the protocol fi with input xi, Pi halts, calling
T for starting an execution of ρj with the other parties, and
continues until T returns the results βj .
C. Machine Learning Preliminary
On the input of an unencrypted training dataset, ML training
algorithms output the ML model parameters θ. After the ob-
jective optimization function is given, ML training algorithms
updates the model parameters θ through a certain parameter
optimization strategy. In this paper, we employ Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD) as the parameter optimization algorithm
in SVM, LR and NB training algorithms.
D. Stochastic Gradient Descent
Gradient descent is an optimization algorithm for finding the
local minimum of a function, which updates the parameters
by using all the records in train dataset. Given a loss function
J (θ), the parameters updating equation of gradient descent is
θ := θ − λ∂J (θ)∂θ , where λ is the learning rate and θ is the
learnable parameters of models.
When the number of the records is large or the gradient
calculation is time-consuming, the updating process using all
samples is slow. Instead of using all samples, SGD randomly
selects a small number of samples to update the gradient at
each iteration, which is typically fast in practice [5]. This paper
uses SGD as the optimization algorithm for LR and SVM
model training.
E. Support Vector Machine
SVM gives the maximum-margin hyperplane that might
classify the test data. The form of the hyperplane is expressed
as f{x} = θTxˆ, xˆ := [x; 1]. For binary classification, if
θTxˆ ≥ 1, the prediction label yi = +1; otherwise the prediction
label yi = −1. The optimization problem of the primary
of SVM as Equation (8). SVM can perform the non-linear
classification by replacing the x in f{x} = θTxˆ with a kernel
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trick κ(xˆ). In this paper, we consider the plain type of SVM,
i.e., κ(xˆ) := xˆ.
min
θ
1
2
||θ||2
s.t. y(θTxˆ) ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, . . . . . . |D|
(8)
Employing Hinge Loss, we define a differentiable loss
function which is shown in Equation (9).
min
θ
|D|∑
i=1
max(0, 1− yiθTxˆi) + λ||θ||2 (9)
We use SGD for solving the parameter θ in Equation (9). For
a records xˆi selected from the training dataset D, the iteration
formula of SVM training algorithm is shown in Equation (10),
where α is the regularization coefficient.
θ :=
{
θ − λ(αθ − αyixˆi), yiθTxˆi < 1
θ − λ(αθ), yiθTxˆi ≥ 1 (10)
F. Logistic Regression
LR is a binary classifier that tries to learn parameters θ,
where θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θd] to satisfy f{xi} = θTxi and f{xi} ∼=
yi. yi is the probability that xi belongs to the positive class.
LR uses the Sigmoid function to associate the true label yi
with the prediction label f{xi}: hθ(xi) = eθ
Txi
1+eθ
Txi
. Choosing
Cross Entropy as the cost function J(θ).
J(θ) = − 1
m
[
m∑
i=1
(yiloghθ(xi) + (1− yi)log(1− hθ(xi)))] (11)
We update the parameters θ with SGD, solving the parameter
values that can minimize J(θ). The iteration formula of LR
training algorithm is shown in Equation (12).
θj := θj − λxij(yi − 1
1 + e−θTxi
) (12)
G. Naive Bayes
The training process of NB is to compute the class prior
probability P (y) and the conditional probability P (xi|y),
where y denotes a certain class category in D. The NB
classifier is expressed as: f(xi) = argmax P (y)
d∏
i=1
P (xi|y).
The class prior probability P (y) can be obtained through
the maximum likelihood estimation, i.e, P (y) = |D(y)|
m
, where
|D(y)| is the number of the class y in D.
For discrete attributes, the conditional probability for the
discrete attributes is P (xij |y) = |D
y(xij)|
m
where |Dy(xij)| is
the number of the number of the j-th attribute having the value
xij with the class y in D.
As for the numeric attributes, probability density func-
tion is considered for computing the conditional probability
P (xi|y). Assuming that P (xij |y) obeys normal distribution
N(µy,j , σ
2
y,j), where µy,j and σ2y,j are mean and variance
respectively for the j-th attributes of the class y respectively.
Then, the conditional probability P (xij |y) can be obtained
from Equation (13).
P (xij |y) = 1√
2piσy,j
exp(− (xij − µy,j)
2
2σ2y,j
) (13)
H. Security Analysis for Building Blocks of Primitive Opera-
tions
When facing the honest-but-curious adversaries, we follow
secure two-party computation for guaranteeing the security of
the proposed building blocks. Here, we present our security
proofs according to the ideas of secure two-party computation.
That is, all the message that can be computed out by a
participant from the intermediate result must be included in
the message that can be computed from its input and output.
Proposition A.1. Secure addition, secure subtraction, se-
cure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication, and secure piphertext-
ciphertext multiplication is secure in the honest-but-curious
model.
Proof A.1 (for Proposition A.1). The input of the data owner
is ((SK,PK)Paillier, a). As the data owner does not receive any
message and call to any other protocols or algorithms during
the execution processes, his view only consists in its input.
Hence, the simulator SO simply generate random coins:
SO(a) = (a, coins) = viewO(a, b)
The input of the model demander is (b). viewA(a, b) =
{b, [b], [a];OutputA}. OutputA = [f(a, b)]. The simulator SA
does the following:
• Generates the random coins necessary for re-
randomization and put them in ˆcoins.
• Generates an encryption using the public key of the data
owner: [c].
• Outputs {[b], [c], ˆcoins; [f(c, b)]}.
coins and ˆcoins come from the same distribution, indepen-
dently from other parameters. Thus,
{[b], [c], ˆcoins; [f(c, b)]} = {[b], [c], coins; [f(a, b)]}
and by ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext
attacks of Paillier,
{[b], [c], coins; [f(c, b)]}≡c{[b], [a], coins; [f(a, b)]}
[a] and [f(a, b)] is encrypted by the public key of
the data owner, the confidentiality of which are equiva-
lent to the cryptosystem. By semantic security of Paillier,
SA(b, F (a, b)) ≡c viewA(a, b).
Proposition A.2. Secure power function is secure in the
honest-but-curious model.
Proof A.2 (for Proposition A.2). The input of data owner is
((SK,PK)CloudRSA, ea), As the data owner does not receive any
message and call to any other protocols during the execution
processes, his view only consists in its input. Hence, the
simulator SO simply generate random coins:
SO(ea) = (ea, coins) = viewO(ea,b)
The input of model demander is (b). viewA(a, b) =
{b, [ea]R, {∏ji=1[eaibi ]R}dj=1;OutputA}. OutputA = [ea·b]R.
The simulator SA does the following:
• Picks 2d random numbers that are limited to ZN :
(aˆ1, ..., aˆd, c1, ..., cd).
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• Encrypts (aˆ1, ..., aˆd) by PKCloudRSA: [eaˆ]R :=
{[aˆ1]R, ..., [aˆd]R}.
• Encrypts (c1, ..., cd) by PKCloudRSA.
• Generates the random coins necessary for re-
randomization and put them in ˆcoins.
• Outputs {b, [eaˆ]R, ˆcoins, {[ci]R}di=1; [eaˆ·b]R}.
coins and ˆcoins come from the same distribution, indepen-
dently from other parameters. Thus,
{b, [eaˆ]R, ˆcoins, {[ci]R}di=1;[eaˆ·b]R}
= {b, [eaˆ]R, coins, {[ci]R}di=1;[eaˆ·b]R}
and by ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext
attacks of Cloud-RSA,
{b, [eaˆ]R, coins, {[ci]R}di=1;[eaˆ·b]R}
≡c{b, [ea]R, coins, {
j∏
i=1
[eaibi ]R}dj=1;[ea·b]R}
= {b, [ea]R, coins, {
j∏
i=1
[eaibi ]R}dj=1;OutputA}
[ea]R,
∏d
i=1[e
aibi ]R and [ea·b]R is encrypted by PKCloudRSA,
the confidentiality of which are equivalent to the cryptosystem.
By semantic security of CloudRSA, SA≡cviewA
Proposition A.3. Secure summation is secure in the honest-
but-curious model.
Proof A.3 (for Proposition A.3). We prove the security of the
secure summation without collusion first.
For the first n− 1 data owners:
The input of Oi is ((SK,PK)iPaillier;ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP ). Each
Oi’s view is
viewOi = {ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP ; outblock9}
where outblock9 means the received output from Building
Blocks 8 in secure summation.
outblock9 = (
i∑
c=1
ac +
n∑
c=i
(ac + rc))
We construct a simulator SO which runs as follows:
• Picks a random c ∈ ZN ;
• Outputs {ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP ; c}.
The distribution of c and
∑i
c=1 ac+
∑n
c=i(ac+ rc) are iden-
tical, so the real distribution {ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP ; outblock9}
and the ideal distribution {ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP ; c} are statis-
tically indistinguishable, i.e., SOi ≡c viewOi .
For the last data owners On:
The input of On is ((SK,PK)nPaillier; an, rn, an + rn, [rn]nP ).
On’s view is
viewOn = {an, rn, an + rn, [rn]nP ; outblock9}
outblock9 = (
n∑
i=1
ai + rA)
We construct a simulator SOn which runs as follows:
• Picks a random c ∈ ZN ;
• Outputs {an, rn, an + rn, [rn]nP ; c}.
The distribution of c and
∑n
i=1 ai + rA are identical, so the
real distribution {an, rn, an + rn, [rn]nP ; outblock9} and the
ideal distribution {an, rn, an + rn, [rn]nP ; c} are statistically
indistinguishable, i.e., SOn ≡c viewOn .
For the model demander A:
The input of model demander A is (SK,PK)APaillier. The view
of model demander is
viewA = {rA, {(ai + ri)}ni=0, {[ri]iP }ni=0,
{[
n∑
i=0
ai +
n∑
i=c
ri]
c
P }nc=0; outblock9}
where outblock9 means the received output from Building
Blocks 8 in secure summation.
outblock9 :=
{
[
∑i
c=1 ac +
∑n
c=i(ac + rc)]
i
P , 1 ≤ i < n∑n
i=1 ai, i = n
We construct a simulator SA which runs as follows:
• Picks 2n random numbers that are limited to ZN :
(aˆ1, ..., aˆn, rˆ1, ..., rˆn).
• Generates {(aˆi + rˆi)}ni=0.
• Generates the random coins necessary for re-
randomization and put them in ˆcoins.
• Encrypts {rˆi}ni=1 by corresponding PKiPaillier.
• Encrypts {∑ni=0 aˆi + ∑nc rˆi}nc=1 by corresponding
PKiPaillier.
• Generates
∑n
i=0 aˆi.
• Outputs:
{ ˆcoins, {(aˆi + rˆi)}ni=0, {[rˆi]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
aˆi +
n∑
i=c
rˆi]
c
P }nc=0
; {[
i∑
c=1
aˆc +
n∑
c=i
(aˆc + rˆc)]
i
P }n−1i=0 ,
n∑
i=0
aˆi}
coins and ˆcoins come from the same distribution, inde-
pendently from other parameters, and the distribution of
(aˆ1, ..., aˆn, rˆ1, ..., rˆn) and (a1, ..., an, r1, ..., rn) are identical,
so the real distribution (a1, ..., an, r1, ..., rn) and the ideal dis-
tribution (aˆ1, ..., aˆn, rˆ1, ..., rˆn) are statistically indistinguish-
able.
{ ˆcoins, {(aˆi + rˆi)}ni=0, {[rˆi]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
aˆi +
n∑
i=c
rˆi]
c
P }nc=0
; {[
i∑
c=1
aˆc +
n∑
c=i
(aˆc + rˆc)]
i
P }n−1i=0 ,
n∑
i=0
aˆi}
≡c{coins, {(ai + ri)}ni=0, {[rˆi]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
aˆi +
n∑
i=c
rˆi]
c
P }nc=0
; {[
i∑
c=1
aˆc +
n∑
c=i
(aˆc + rˆc)]
i
P }n−1i=0 ,
n∑
i=0
ai}
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by ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext at-
tacks of Paillier
{coins, {(ai + ri)}ni=0, {[rˆi]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
aˆi +
n∑
i=c
rˆi]
c
P }nc=0
; {[
i∑
c=1
aˆc +
n∑
c=i
(aˆc + rˆc)]
i
P }n−1i=0 ,
n∑
i=0
ai}
≡c{coins, {(ai + ri)}ni=0, {[ri]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
ai +
n∑
i=c
ri]
c
P }nc=0
; {[
i∑
c=1
ac +
n∑
c=i
(ac + rc)]
i
P }n−1i=0 ,
n∑
i=0
ai}
i.e., SA ≡c viewA.
Collusion situations.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−1) data owners
collude with each other to infer the summation
∑n
i=0 ai and
other data owners’ data. Considering the most extreme case,
α = n− 1. The n− 1 data owners have information:
{{ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP }n−1i=1 ,
n−1∑
c=1
ac + (an + rn), an + rn}
It is straightforward that the random noise rn in
∑n−1
c=1 ac +
(an + rn) hides
∑n
i=0 ai in an information-theoretic way (it
is an one-time pad). Similarly, an cannot be figured out too.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−2) data owners
collude with model demander to infer other data owners’ data.
Considering the most extreme case, α = n − 2, where On−1
and On do not participate in collusion.
The n− 2 data owners have information:
{{ai, ri, ai + ri, [ri]iP }n−2i=1 ,
n−2∑
c=1
ac +
n∑
c=n−2
(ac + rc)} (14)
The model demander have information:
{{(ai + ri)}ni=0, {[ri]iP }ni=0, {[
n∑
i=0
ai +
n∑
i=c
ri]
c
P }nc=0,
{[
i∑
c=1
ac +
n∑
c=i
(ac + rc)]
i
P }ni=0}
(15)
Combining Equation (14) and Equation (15), we obtain:
{(an + an−1), (an−1 + rn−1), (an + rn), [rn−1]n−1P , [rn]nP }
Ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks
of Paillier ensures that no bit of information is leaked from
[rn−1]n−1P , [rn]
n
P . The random noise rn and rn−1 hides an
and an−1 respectively in an information-theoretic way (it is
an one-time pad).
The model demander and data owners may try to infer an
and an−1 from an + an−1. In this case, we see an + an−1
as a ciphertext, where the model demander and data owners
infer information by observing an + an−1.
That is, the model demander and data owners just observes
a ciphertext an+an−1 and attempts to determine information
about the underlying plaintext (or plaintexts), which is a
ciphertext-only attack. Observing an + an−1 has no effect on
the knowledge regarding the actual message that was sent.
I. Security Analysis for Building Blocks of Conversion
Proposition A.4. Secure converting [ea·b]R to [e
a·b]P is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof A.4 (for Proposition A.4). The input of data owner is
{(SK,PK)Paillier,(SK,PK)CloudRSA}. O’s view is
viewO = (ea·b+r, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b+r]P )
We construct a simulator SO which runs as follows:
• Picks two random vectors (aˆ, bˆ).
• Picks a random c, computes ec+aˆ·bˆ.
• Generates the random coins necessary for re-
randomization and put them in ˆcoins.
• Encrypts ec+aˆ·bˆ under PKPaillier and PKCloudRSA respec-
tively.
• Outputs (ec+aˆ·bˆ, [ec+aˆ·bˆ]P , [ec+aˆ·bˆ]R, ˆcoins).
coins and ˆcoins come from the same distribution, indepen-
dently from other parameters,
(ec+aˆ·bˆ, [ec+aˆ·bˆ]P , [ec+aˆ·bˆ]R, ˆcoins)
= (ec+aˆ·bˆ, [ec+aˆ·bˆ]P , [ec+aˆ·bˆ]R,coins)
The distribution of (a · b + r) and (aˆ · bˆ + c) are identical,
so the real distribution (ea·b+r, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b+r]P ) and the
ideal distribution (ec+aˆ·bˆ, [ec+aˆ·bˆ]P , [ec+aˆ·bˆ]R are statistically
indistinguishable,
(ec+aˆ·bˆ, [ec+aˆ·bˆ]P , [ec+aˆ·bˆ]R)
≡c(ea·b+r, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b+r]P )
Thus, SO ≡c viewO.
The input of model demander is {ea·b}.
viewA = (r, [ea·b]R, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b+r]P , [ea·b]P )
We construct a simulator SA which runs as follows:
• Picks 2 random numbers that are limited to ZN : c1, c2.
• Generates ec2 , ec1+c2
• Generates the random coins necessary for re-
randomization and put them in ˆcoins.
• Encrypts ec1+c2 by PKPaillier.
• Encrypts ec2 by PKPaillier.
• Encrypts ec1+c2 by PKCloudRSA.
• Encrypts ec2 by PKCloudRSA.
• Outputs ( ˆcoins, c1, [ec2 ]R, [ec1+c2 ]R, [ec1+c2 ]P , [ec2 ]P )
coins and ˆcoins come from the same distribution, inde-
pendently from other parameters, and by ciphertext indistin-
guishability against chosen plaintext attacks of Paillier and
Cloud-RSA,
(c1, [e
c2 ]R, [e
c1+c2 ]R, [e
c1+c2 ]P , [e
c2 ]P )
≡c(r, [ea·b]R, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b+r]P , [ea·b]P )
[ea·b]R, [ea·b+r]R, [ea·b]P and [ea·b+r]P are encrypted by data
owners’ public key, the confidentiality of which is equivalent
to the cryptosystem. Thereby SA ≡c viewA.
Proposition A.5. Secure converting [m]1P to [m]
2
P is secure
in the honest-but-curious model.
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Proof A.5 (for Proposition A.5). The input of data owner is
{(SK,PK)1Paillier, (PK)2Paillier}. O’s view is
viewOn = (m+ r, [m+ r]
1
P , [m+ r]
2
P )
We construct a simulator SO which runs as follows:
• Picks a random c, c ∈ ZN .
• Encrypts c under PK1Paillier and PK
2
Paillier respectively.
• Outputs (c, [c]1P , [c]
2
P ).
The distribution of c and m+ r are identical, so the real dis-
tribution (m+r, [m+r]1P , [m+r]
2
P ) and the ideal distribution
(c, [c]1P , [c]
2
P ) are statistically indistinguishable,
(m+ r, [m+ r]1P , [m+ r]
2
P )≡c(c, [c]1P , [c]2P )
Thus, SO ≡c viewO.
The input of model demander is {[m]1P}.
viewA = {r, [m]1P , [m]2P , [m+ r]1P , [m+ r]2P }
[m]1P , [m+r]
1
P , [m]
2
P , [m+r]
2
P are encrypted by data owners’
public key, the confidentiality of which is equivalent to the
cryptosystem. Thereby SA ≡c viewA.
J. Security Analysis for ML Training Protocols
Definition 4 (Ciphertext-only Attack [37]). This is the most
basic attack, and refers to a scenario where the adversary just
observes a ciphertext (or multiple ciphertexts) and attempts
to determine information about the underlying plaintext (or
plaintexts).
Definition 5 (Perfectly Secret [37]). An encryption scheme
(Gen,Enc,Dec) with message space M is perfectly secret
if for every probability distribution over M , every message
m ∈M , and every ciphertext c ∈ C for which Pr[C = c] > 0:
Pr[M = m|C = c] = Pr[M = m]
Recalling that our security goal is achieving keeping privacy
of each participant and computing model parameters securely
when facing honest-but-curious adversaries. Both the model
of model demander A and the sensitive datasets from n data
owners Oi are confidential throughout the execution of secure
ML training protocols. This section gives the security anal-
yses for the three privacy-preserving ML training protocols
instantiated from Heda.
We follow the ides of Modular Sequential Composition to
present the security proofs. If we can show that a protocol pi
respects privacy in the honest-but-curious model using calls to
a series of ideal functionalities, and these ideal functionalities
can be replaced by real secure protocols in the semi-honest
model, pi is secure in the honest-but-curious model. Then we
discuss the security in situations of collusion.
Proposition A.6. Privacy-preserving SVM training protocol
is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof A.6 (for Proposition A.6). We prove the security without
collusion first. Because the model demander and n data owner
perform interactive computations in turn, we analyze the secu-
rity according to definition of Secure Two-party Computation.
For each data owner Oi.
After sending the encrypted dataset to model demander, the
data owner does not receive any message and call to any other
protocols during the execution processes, his view only con-
sists in its input. The input of the data owner is ((SK,PK)iPaillier,
Di). We use the trivial simulator that just outputs its inputs for
the proof of security. Hence, SOi = (Di, coins) = viewOi .
For model demander A.
The input of the model demander is the initialized model
parameters (θ). The model demander’s view is
viewA = {θ, [Y]iP, [XY]iP, [θxtyt]iP, [λαxtyt]iP;
outblock9}
where outblock9 denote the received outputs from Building
Blocks 7 respectively.
We construct a simulator SA which runs as follows:
• Uniformly picks a value v from {1, 0}.
• Picks a random θˆ.
• Picks 4 random numbers c1, c2, c3, c4, ci ∈ ZN .
• Encrypts c1, c2, c3, c4 by PKiPaillier.
• Outputs {θ, [c1]iP , [c2]iP , [c3]iP , [c4]iP ; θˆ, v}.
by ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext at-
tacks of Paillier:
{[c1]iP , [c2]iP , [c3]iP , [c4]iP }≡c
{[Y]iP, [XY]iP, [θxtyt]iP, [λαxtyt]iP)}
The distribution of {v, θˆ} and {(1 >?[θxtyt]iP ), update(θ)}
are come from the same distribution, independently from other
parameters:
{v, θˆ}≡c{(1 >?[θxtyt]iP ), update(θ)}
The model demander may try to infer data owners’ data
from θ or update(θ). In this case, we see (θ, update(θ))
as a ciphertext, where model demander infers information by
observing (θ, update(θ)).
That is the model demander just observes a ciphertext (θ
and update(θ)) and attempts to determine information about
the underlying plaintext (or plaintexts) in training dataset
D, which is a ciphertext-only attack. Besides, observing θ
and update(θ) have no effect on the the model demander’s
knowledge regarding the actual message that was sent. For
every probability data in training dataset xi ∈ D, and every
ciphertext θ and update(θ):
Pr[M = xi|C = θ or update(θ)] = Pr[M = xi]
Thus, inferring data owners’ data from θ or update(θ)
is a ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret. Thereby
SA ≡c viewA.
In particular, secure addition, secure plaintext-ciphertext
dot product and Building Block 8 are secure in the honest-but-
curious model. We obtain the security of privacy-preserving
SVM training protocol using Modular Sequential Composition.
Collusion situations.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−1) data owners
collude with each other to infer the model parameters θ and
other data owners’ data. Considering the most extreme case,
α = n− 1. The n− 1 data owners have information:
{([Y]iP, [XY]iP)n−1i=1 }
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Since the n− 1 data owners didn’t receive the complete θ,
and θ is encrypted by the model demander’s public key. It is
straightforward that θ cannot be figured out.
Without the corresponding private key of the data owner
who do not participating in the collusion, the ciphertext in-
distinguishability of Paillier ensures that no bit of information
is leaked from ciphertexts of other data owners who do not
participating in the collusion.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−2) data owners
collude with the model demander to infer other data owners’
data. Considering the most extreme cases, α = n− 2.
The n− 2 data owners have information:
{([Y]iP, [XY]iP)n−2i=1 } (16)
The model demander have information:
{θ, ([Y]iP, [XY]iP, [θxtyt]iP, [λαxtyt]iP)ni=0} (17)
Combining Equation (16) and Equation (17), we deduce
that:
{θ, (Y,XY, θxtyt, λαxtyt)n−2i=0 } with
([Y]iP, [XY]
i
P, [θxtyt]
i
P, [λαxtyt]
i
P)
n
i=n−1}
Without the corresponding private key, they cannot figure out
([Y]iP, [XY]
i
P)
n
i=n−1.
Proposition A.7. Privacy-preserving LR training protocol is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof A.7 (for Proposition A.7). We prove the security without
collusion first. Because model demander and each data owner
perform interactive computations in turn, we analyze the secu-
rity according to definition of Secure Two-party Computation.
For each data owner Oi.
The input of the data owner is ((SK,PK)iPaillier,
(SK,PK)iCloudRSA, Di). The data owner does not call to
any other protocols or algorithms during the execution
processes.
viewOi = (Di, [eθxt+r + er]P ,
xt
eθxt+r + er
, [
xt
eθxt+r + er
]P )
(18)
We construct a simulator SOi which runs as follows:
• Uniformly picks a value c.
• Picks a random θˆ.
• Picks a record xˆt from Di.
• Generates xˆt
eθˆxˆt+c+ec
and eθˆxˆt+c + ec.
• Encrypts xˆt
eθˆxˆt+c+ec
and eθˆxˆt+c + ec by PKiPaillier.
• Outputs ([ xˆt
eθˆxˆt+c+ec
]P , [e
θˆxˆt+c + ec]P , e
θˆxˆt+c + ec).
The real distribution (r, θ,xi) and the ideal distribution
(c, θˆ, xˆi) are come from the same distribution, independently
from other parameters,
([eθxt+r + er]P ,
xt
eθxt+r + er
, [
xt
eθxt+r + er
]P )
≡c([ xˆt
eθˆxˆt+c + ec
]P , [e
θˆxˆt+c + ec]P , e
θˆxˆt+c + ec)
Hence, SOi≡cviewOi .
For model demander A.
The input of model demander the initialized model param-
eters (θ). The model demander’s view is
viewA = {θ, [xtyt]P , [ext ]R, r, [e−θxt+r + er]P , [λxtyt]P ,
[
xt
e−θxt+r + er
]P , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]P , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]P ;
outblock5; outblock8; outblock9}
outblock5 = [e
−θxt ]R; outblock8 = [e−θxt ]P ;
outblock9 = update(θ)
As you can see, except for the model parameters θ, all other
data are encrypted by data owners public key. As Paillier
and Cloud-RSA’s cryptosystem is semantically secure, model
demander can only infer training dataset information from
from θ or update(θ).
In this case, we see (θ, update(θ)) as a ciphertext,
where model demander infers information by observing (θ,
update(θ)). But the model demander just observes a ciphertext
(θ, update(θ)) and attempts to determine information about
the underlying plaintext (or plaintexts) of training dataset
D, which is a ciphertext-only attack. Besides, observing θ
and update(θ) have no effect on the the model demander’s
knowledge regarding the actual message that was sent. That
is for every probability data in training dataset xi ∈ D, and
every ciphertext θ and update(θ):
Pr[M = xi|C = θ or update(θ)] = Pr[M = xi]
Thus, inferring data owners’ data from θ or update(θ)
is a ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret. Thereby
SA ≡c viewA.
In particular, secure power function, Bilding Block 8, se-
cure addition, secure plaintext-ciphertext multiplication, se-
cure subtraction, and Building Block 8 are secure in the
honest-but-curious model. We obtain the security of privacy-
preserving LR training protocol using Modular Sequential
Composition.
Collusion situations.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−1) data owners
collude with each other to infer the model parameters θ and
other data owners’ data. Considering the most extreme case,
α = n− 1. The n− 1 data owners have information:
{(Di, [eθxt+r + er]P , xt
eθxt+r + er
, [
xt
eθxt+r + er
]P )
n−1
i=0 }
This case is almost the same as Equation (18) where each
data owner without collusion, the security of which that we
have proved above. Thus, θ cannot be figured out.
Without the corresponding private key of the data owner
who do not participating in the collusion, the ciphertext in-
distinguishability of Paillier ensures that no bit of information
is leaked from ciphertexts of other data owners who do not
participating in the collusion.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−2) data owners
collude with model demander to infer other data owners’ data.
Considering the most extreme cases, α = n− 2.
The n− 2 data owners have information:
{(Di, [eθxt+r + er]P , xt
eθxt+r + er
, [
xt
eθxt+r + er
]P )
n−2
i=0 }
(19)
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The model demander have information:
{θ, ([xtyt]iP , [ext ]iR, r, [e−θxt+r + er]iP , [λxtyt]P ,
[
xt
e−θxt+r + er
]iP , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]iP , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]iP ,
[e−θxt ]iR, [e
−θxt ]iP )
n
i=0}
(20)
Combining Equation (19) and Equation (20), we obtain:
{θ, (xtyt, ext , r, e−θxt+r + er, λxtyt,
xt
e−θxt+r + er
,
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ,
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ,
e−θxt , e−θxt)n−2i=0 } with
([xtyt]
i
P , [e
xt ]iR, r, [e
−θxt+r + er]iP , [λxtyt]P ,
[
xt
e−θxt+r + er
]iP , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]iP , [
λxt
e−θxt+r + er
+ θ]iP ,
[e−θxt ]iR, [e
−θxt ]iP )
n
i=n−1
Without the corresponding private key, they cannot figure out
([xtyt]
i
P , [e
xt ]iR)
n
i=n−1. Therefor, α data owners collude with
model demander cannot infer other data owners’ data.
Proposition A.8. Privacy-preserving NB training protocol is
secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Proof A.8 (for Proposition A.8). We prove the security without
collusion first.
For each data owner Oi.
After sending the encrypted dataset to model demander, the
data owner does not receive any message and call to any other
protocols during the execution processes, his view only con-
sists in its input. The input of the data owner is ((SK,PK)iPaillier,
Di). We use the trivial simulator that just outputs its inputs for
the proof of security. Hence, SOi = (Di, coins) = viewOi .
For model demander A. The input of model demander is
((SK,PK)APaillier). The model demander’s view is
viewA = {
µy,j , σ
2
y,j ,
n∑
c=1
|Dc(y)|,
n∑
c=1
|Dyc (xij)|,
|D|∑
i=1
xij ,
|D|∑
i=1
(xij)
2}
(21)
µy,j =
∑|D|
i=1 xij
m
σ2y,j =
∑|D|
i=1(µy,j)
2
m
+
∑|D|
i=1(xij)
2
m
− 2µy,j ∗
∑|D|
i=1(xij)
m
Model demander may try to infer data owners’ data from his
view. In this case, we see the message in Equation (21) as a
ciphertext, where model demander infers information of D by
observing these message. The model demander just observes
the message in Equation (21) and attempts to determine
information about the underlying plaintext (or plaintexts),
which is a ciphertext-only attack.
Observing the message in Equation (21) have no effect on
the the model demander’s knowledge regarding the actual
message that was sent. That is for every probability data in
training dataset x ∈ D, and every ciphertext c ∈ Equation
(21):
Pr[M = x|C = c] = Pr[M = x]
Thus, inferring data owners’ data from message in Equation
(21) is a ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret. Thereby
SA ≡c viewA.
In particular, secure summation protocol is secure in the
honest-but-curious model. We obtain the security of privacy-
preserving SVM training protocol using Modular Sequential
Composition.
Collusion situations.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−1) data owners
collude with each other to infer the model parameters P (y)
and P (xi|y) and other data owners’ data. Considering the
most extreme case, α = n − 1. The n − 1 data owners have
information:
{(Di)n−1i=1 }
Since the n − 1 data owners didn’t even receive other
information during Protocol 3,. It is straightforward that P (y)
and P (xi|y) cannot be figured out. Without the corresponding
private key of the data owner who do not participating in the
collusion, the ciphertext indistinguishability of Paillier ensures
that no bit of information is leaked.
 We discuss the security when α (α ≤ n−2) data owners
collude with the model demander to infer other data owners’
data. Considering the most extreme cases, α = n− 2.
The n− 2 data owners have information:
{(Di)n−2i=1 } (22)
The model demander have information:
{µy,j , σ2y,j ,
n∑
c=1
|Dc(y)|,
n∑
c=1
|Dyc (xij)|,
|D|∑
i=1
xij ,
|D|∑
i=1
(xij)
2}
(23)
Combining Equation (16) and Equation (17), we can figure
out:
{(|Dn−1(y)|+ |Dn(y)|), (|Dyn−1(xij)|+ |Dyn(xij)|),∑
xij∈Dn−1∪Dn
xij ,
∑
xij∈Dn−1∪Dn
(xij)
2} (24)
Model demander and data owners try to infer xij , yi ∈ Dn−1∪
Dn from Equation 24.
In this case, we see the message in Equation (24) as a
ciphertext. The model demander just observes a ciphertext
and attempts to determine information about the underlying
plaintext (or plaintexts), which is a ciphertext-only attack.
Observing the message in Equation (24) have no effect on
the the model demander’s knowledge regarding the actual
message that was sent. That is for every probability data
in training dataset x ∈ Dn−1 ∪ Dn, and every ciphertext
c ∈ Equation (24):
Pr[M = x|C = c] = Pr[M = x]
Thus, inferring data owners’ data from message in Equation
(21) is a ciphertext-only attack with perfectly secret.
Therefor, α data owners collude with model demander
cannot infer other data owners’ data.
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K. Complexity Analysis
Let l be the length of attribute value. Supposing n is the
number of data owners, and T is the maximum number of
iterations.
It is straightforward that the number of ciphertext compu-
tation included in the following building blocks is constant:
secure addition, secure subtraction, secure plaintext-ciphertext
multiplication, secure piphertext-ciphertext multiplication se-
cure summation and two converting building blocks. There-
fore, the time complexity of the above building blocks is O(1).
The number of the outermost loop is d in secure power
function and secure plaintext-ciphertext dot product, which
processes one attribute at each loop. The time complexity of
secure power function is O(ld).
Privacy-preserving SVM training protocol employs secure
plaintext-ciphertext dot product in each iteration. Thus, the
time complexity is O(T ld).
Privacy-preserving LR training protocol adopts secure
power function in each iteration. Hence, the time complexity
is O(T ld).
Privacy-preserving NB training protocol calls for other
building blocks than secure power function and secure
plaintext-ciphertext dot product. And the number of the out-
ermost loop of it is d. Therefor, the time complexity of it is
O(d · ld).
L. Homomorphic Definition
Formalized definition of homomorphic is given in Definition
6.
Definition 6 (Homomorphic [37]). A public-key encryption
scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is homomorphic if for all n and all
(PK, SK) output by Gen(1n), it is possible to define groups
M, C (depending on PK only) such that:
1) The message space is M, and all ciphertexts output by
EncPK are elements of C.
2) For any m1,m2 ∈M, any c1 output by EncPK(m1), and
any c2 output by EncPK(m2), it holds that DecSK(o(c1,
c2)) = σ(m1,m1).
M. A Case Study of Secure Power Function
This section provides a case study for explicating the
recovering of eθixi from [exiθ1i ]R and [exiθ2i ]R. The input of
the data owner is:
x = {0.1, 0.2}, ex = {1.10517091808, 1.22140275816}
eˆx = {110, 122}; [eˆx]R = {[110]R, [122]R}
The input of model demander is:
θ = {1.31, 2.42}, θˆ = {(1, 31), (2, 42)}
4 Secure power function. The data owner sends [eˆx]R to
the model demander. The model demander computes:
{([110]R1, [110]R31), ([122]R2, [122]R42)} ⇔
{([110]R, [1.9194342e+ 63]R), ([14884]R, [4.237531e+ 87]R)}
→ {[1637240]R, [8.133662e+ 150]R}
At this time, the model demander has finished a secure power
function ([1637240]R ∗ [ 100
√
8.133662e+ 150]R = [ ˆexθ]R). In our
privacy-preserving LR training protocol, the model demander
continues to Bilding Block 8.
4 Conversion protocol (Bilding Block 8) for recovering.
The model demander picks a r = −2 randomly, and computes:
e−2 = 0.13533528323; ˆe−2 = 1353; [e−2]R = [1353]R
[ ˆexθ+1.01r]R = {[2215185720]R, [1.100484e+ 154]R}
The model demander sends ([ ˆexθ+1.01r]R, (1+2)∗2+4, (31+
42) ∗ 2 + 4) to the data owner. The data owner computes:
[ ˆexθ+1.01r]R → ˆexθ+1.01r = 2215185720
1e+ 10
∗ 100
√
1.100484e+ 154
1e+ 150
=0.221518572 ∗ 0.97817337451 = 0.21668356909
0.21668356909→ 22→ [22]P
The data owner sends [22]P to the model demander. e2.02 =
7.53832493366 → (7, 54) The model demander obtains
[ ˆexθ]P by:
{([22]P 7, 2 ∗ 7), ([22]P 54, 2 ∗ 54 + 2)} ⇔
{([154]P , 2), ([1188]P , 4)}
Bilding Block 8 is end at here, where the plaintext of
{([154]P , 2), ([1188]P , 4)} is 154100 + 118810000 = 1.6588 ≈
e0.1∗1.31+0.2∗2.42 = 1.83.
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